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INTRODUCTION
Reconstruction and the rise of leftwing thought in the wake
of World War II brought unprecedented attention to educational
equality across the globe. Most prominently, the U.S. Supreme
Court’s unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education not
only marked a milestone in the fight for equal rights in education for
African-Americans,1 but also inspired many other traditionally
disadvantaged groups at home and abroad. 2 The pursuit of
*

S.J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School. Research Fellow,
Research Center for Education Law, Peking University. My foremost and deepest thanks
go to my advisor and mentor, Professor Sophia Z. Lee. For helpful comments and careful
reads, special thanks to Professors Jacques deLisle, Emily Hannum, and William Ewald.
Many thanks also go to Professors Zhan Zhongle, Yan Tian, Shen Weiwei, Neysun
Mahboubi, as well as the participants in the 2017 National SJD Roundtable and the 2019
Law and Society Association Annual Meeting, for valuable thoughts and insightful
feedbacks. Errors are my own.
1 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Sup. Ct. Assoc. J., Brown v. Board of
Education in International Context, Speech at the University of Pretoria Centre for Human
Rights
(Feb.
7,
2006),
available
at
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educational equality in Maoist China was a surging yet overlooked
part of that wave of movements. Unlike the U.S., where civil rights
reforms were scattered across states and pursued by many
organizations, the highly centralized system in post-1949 China
produced a nationally unitary and clearly defined connotation of
educational equality.3
How, then, was educational equality
conceived and practiced in Mao-era China? This Article answers
this question by narrating the constitutional conception of equalityas-empowerment and how equal education laws were designed to
transform the masses into the workforce deemed necessary for rapid
industrialization.
The controversy over educational equality has become one
of the prominent conflicts in contemporary Chinese society. 4 It is,
however, never easy to reach an agreed upon definition of equality
even when narrowed down to the field of education. 5 As with other
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_02-07a-06
[https://perma.cc/2FG9-946Z].
3 See infra Part II.
4 See, e.g., Education Inequality for Migrants’ Children: “This Problem Has Taken
Over My Life,” OBSERVERS (Feb. 28, 2012), https://observers.france24.com/en/20120228china-beijing-amid-mounting-inequality-hukou-migrant-workers-demand-education-rights
[https://perma.cc/7N9E-E9MC] (discussing a gathering of hundreds outside China’s
Ministry of Education to demand equal education rights for children of migrant workers);
Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Women in China Face Rising University Entry Barriers, N. Y. TIMES
(Oct. 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/08iht-educlede08.html
[https://perma.cc/P3D2-LV4S] (discussing that women who shaved their heads protested
the growing gender discrimination in university admissions); Chris Buckley, Henan
Delegates Protest Inequality in University Admissions, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015),
https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20150311/c11university/dual/ [https://perma.cc/Y63J-CLD2]
(discussing the discrimination in university admissions against applicants from provinces
such as Henan); Javier C. Hernández, China Tries to Redistribute Education to the Poor,
Igniting
Class
Conflict,
N.
Y.
TIMES
(June
11,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/world/asia/china-higher-education-for-the-poorprotests.html [https://perma.cc/Q3E5-CF9P] (discussing a series of protests occurred in
four provinces against a reform in university admission quotas that was believed to be
detrimental to the children of local middle class); Ding Jie et al., School District Reform
Prompts Parent Protests in Beijing, CAIXIN (July 9, 2018, 08:26 PM),
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2018-07-09/school-district-reform-prompts-parent-protestsin-beijing-101297434.html [https://perma.cc/G5JK-AMLC] (discussing protests about a
school district reform in Beijing that no longer guarantee the children of the “residents of
sought-after school districts and recent homebuyers who paid a steep premium” to be
admitted to an elite school) (italic added).
5 See, e.g., Mary Warnock, The Concept of Equality in Education, 1 O. REV. EDUC. 3
(1975) (distinguishing “an equal right to education” and “a right to equal education”); Julia
Kwong & Hong Xiao, Educational Equality Among China’s Minorities, 25 COMP. EDUC.
229, 229–30 (1989) (discussing three interpretations of educational equality).
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canonical constitutional terminology, the concept of equality is
abstract, ambiguous, and may even be considered “empty.” 6 As a
result, the conventional research on educational equality in China is
comprised mostly of empirical and quantitative sociological studies
and a handful of legal studies that are difficult to place in
conversation with each other due to their vague and contested
definitions of equality. 7 This Article, in contrast, in order to
addresses the controversy, reframes equality through a
constitutional construction of educational equality.
All five of China’s constitutions since the People’s Republic
have promised equality, for example, that “[w]omen shall enjoy
equal rights with men,”8 “[a]ll nationalities . . . are equal,”9 and

6

See, e.g., Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982);
Steven J. Burton, Comment on “Empty Ideas”: Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and
Rule, 91 YALE L. J. 1136 (1982); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty Is the Idea of Equality?, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1983); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 2 (2000).
7 See, e.g., Xue Lan Rong & Tianjian Shi, Inequality in Chinese Education, 10 J.
CONTEMP. CHINA 107 (2001); Emily Hannum, Poverty and Basic Education in Rural
China: Villages, Households, and Girls’ and Boys’ Enrollment, 47 COMP. EDUC. REV. 141
(2003); Wing-Wah Law & Su-Yan Pan, Legislation and Equality in Basic Education for
All in China, 40 INTERCHANGE 337 (2009).
8 GONGTONG GANGLING (共同纲领) [Common Program of the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference] (adopted by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference, Sept. 29, 1949), CLI.1.124417(EN)
(Lawinfochina), art. 6 (“Women shall enjoy equal rights with men in political, economic,
cultural, educational and social life.”) [hereinafter GONGTONG GANGLING]; XIANFA art. 86,
§ 2 (1954) (“Women shall enjoy the equal right with men to vote and to be elected.”), art.
96, § 1 (1954) (“Women shall enjoy equal rights with men in political, economic, cultural,
social, and family life.”); XIANFA art. 27, § 4 (1975) (“Women shall enjoy equal rights with
men in all respects.”); XIANFA art. 53, § 1 (1978) (“Women shall enjoy equal rights with
men in political, economic, cultural, social, and family life. Equal pay for equal work for
men and women.”); XIANFA art. 48 (1982) (“Women shall enjoy equal rights with men in
political, economic, cultural, social, and family life. The state shall protect the rights and
interests of women, apply the principle of equal pay for equal work to men and women
alike, and train and select cadres from among women.”) (emphasis added).
9 GONGTONG GANGLING, supra note 8, art. 9 (“All nationalities in the People’s
Republic of China shall have equal rights and duties.”), art. 50 (“All nationalities within
the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China are equal.”); XIANFA art. 3, § 2 (1954)
(“All nationalities are equal.”), art. 58 (“The local people’s congresses . . . [shall]
safeguard the rights of citizens and the equal rights of minority nationalities.”); XIANFA art.
4, § 2 (1975) (“All nationalities are equal.”); XIANFA art. 4, § 2 (1978) (“All nationalities
are equal.”), art. 36, § 1 (1978) (“The local people’s congresses . . . [shall] safeguard the
rights of citizens and the equal rights of national minorities.”); XIANFA art. 4, § 1 (1982)
(“All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal.”), art. 89, § 11 (1982)
(“[The State Council shall] . . . safeguard the equal rights of minority nationalities.”) (italic
added).
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“[a]ll citizens . . . are equal before the law.”10 They have also
created a right to education and made it subject to the requirement
of equal treatment.11 Such textual commitments, however, are
abstract and loosely defined, if not rhetorical, the courts are
restrained from interpreting the Constitution,12 and the statutes and
administrative rules are devoid of an articulated conception of
equality. Therefore, constructing the constitutional concept of
educational equality requires attending to political sources, such as
leaders’ speeches and Party documents in history.13 Documentation
and analysis of laws and regulations in education and beyond
further refines and bolsters that constitutional construction. This
Article thus construes equality not only by exploring the founders’
explicit perceptions and visions of equality, but also by analyzing
the conceptions of equality implicit in those legal-historical sources.
It holds that educational equality as a secondary constitutional
value, always serves the ultimate constitutional vision, 14 which has
10 XIANFA art. 85 (1954) (“All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal
before the law.”); XIANFA art. 33, § 2 (1982) (“All citizens of the People’s Republic of
China are equal before the law.”) (italic added).
11 GONGTONG G ANGLING, supra note 8, art. 6 (“Women shall enjoy equal rights with
men in political, economic, cultural, educational and social life.”); XIANFA art. 94, § 1
(1954) (“Citizens of the People’s Republic of China shall have the right to education.”);
XIANFA art. 27, § 2 (1975) (“Citizens shall have the right to work and the right to
education.”); XIANFA art. 51, § 1 (1978) (“Citizens shall have the right to education. The
state shall gradually increase the number of schools and other cultural and educational
facilities of all types and popularize education, in order to ensure the enjoyment of this
right by its citizens.”); XIANFA art. 46, § 1 (1982) (“Citizens of the People’s Republic of
China have the right and duty to education.”) (italic added).
12 Guanyu yi Qinfan Xingmingquan de Shouduan Qinfan Xianfa Baohu de Gongmin
Shoujiaoyu de Jiben Quanli Shifou Ying Chengdan Minshi Zeren de Pifu (关于以侵犯姓
名权的手段侵犯宪法保护的公民受教育的基本权利是否应承担民事责任的批复)
[Reply on Whether the Accused Shall Bear Civil Liability for the Infringement of the
Citizen’s Fundamental Rights of Receiving Education under the Protection of Constitution
by Means of Infringing the Right of Name] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., July 24,
2001, effective Aug. 13, 2001, repealed Dec. 24, 2008), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ, May 1,
2001, at 152, translated in CLI.3.36302(EN) (Lawinfochina).
13 For arguments that constitutional construction depends on such historical factors as
“privileged sources of meaning, inspiration, and guidance,” see, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, at ix–x, 245–75 (2012); Jack M. Balkin, The New
Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 652, 672–91 (2013); Jiang
Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of
Constitutional Government in China, 36(1) MOD. CHINA 12, 25–37 (2010); Xin He, The
Party’s Leadership as a Living Constitution in China, 42 HONG KONG L. J. 73 (2012).
14 For the ultimate constitutional vision, see, e.g., GONGTONG G ANGLING, supra note
8, art. 1 (writing “for independence, democracy, peace, unity, prosperity and strength of
China”); XIANFA pmbl. ¶ 1 (1954) (envisioning that “in a peaceful way banish exploitation
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often been embodied in concrete national objectives at different
historical stages. The implicit conception of educational equality
can thus be inferred by examining the national objective of a given
period and its interaction with equal education laws.
The Mao era stands out in construing the constitutional
conception of educational equality. This is not only because the
leaders of that era’s ideas and their practices have significantly
shaped law and society in contemporary China; 15 Moreover, it is
because the Maoist ideology, albeit superseded by that of the
transformative reform era that followed, has become a specter
haunting China ready, if not already, for a resurgence. 16
Understanding equality in the Mao-era constitution, both as written
and politically constructed, therefore, is needed to determine its
significance for today’s controversies. Accordingly, this Article
adopts a legal-historical and legal-sociological research approach. It
traces three decades of the Mao-era constitutional history, both in
and beyond the legal text: not only exhaustively examining
education laws and regulations in government gazettes and the
Chinalawinfo database; but also scrutinizing the coverage and
discourse in People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), People’s Education
(Renmin Jiaoyu), Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, and other Party
leaders’ remarks that pertain to the conception of educational
equality. The Article also draws on data from the China Statistical
Yearbooks and the China Education Yearbooks to contextualize the
implementation of the laws and policies and their effects. By
analyzing those primary sources, this Article reveals that the
founders of socialist China, pursuing the goal of industrialization,
conceived of equality in education as the empowerment of the
and poverty and build a prosperous and happy socialist society”); XIANFA pmbl. ¶ 7 (1982)
(professing “to modernize the industry, agriculture, national defense, and science and
technology” and “to turn China into a socialist country that is highly civilized and
democratic”). For the argument that the same is true of the United States, see Mengyun
Ma, The Evolving Concept of Equality in Education: From WWII to Freeman 2 (Mar. 28,
2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
15
See, e.g., AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM: POLITICAL CONCEPTS FROM MAO TO
XI (Christian Sorace et al. eds., 2019) (depicting various political concepts of the Mao era
and how they have shaped Chinese politics today).
16 For arguments that Xi Jinping has closed China’s reform era and revived Maoism,
see, e.g., Suisheng Zhao, Xi Jinping’s Maoist Revival, 27 J. DEMOCRACY 83 (July 2016);
Willy Lam, Xi Jinping’s Ideology and Statecraft, 48 CHINESE L. & GOV’T 409, 412 (2016);
CARL MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN REVIVAL IS UNDERMINING
ITS RISE (2018).
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workforce. That notion of workforce equality was a constant in the
dramatic revolution of Mao-era China.
Reframing the concept of equality in Mao-era China, this
Article’s contribution is twofold. First and foremost, the Article
draws out the thread of the idea of equality embedded in the
constitutional law of education and theorizes it. Like many of its
counterparts in other arenas of the period, Maoist education law
featured the mass line and mass mobilization campaigns. 17
Maoism’s egalitarian implications have thus been the intuitive
perception of much of the population and have been inspected in
many scholarly works. 18 Interestingly, however, some scholars
have perceptively noted that beneath the veil of plain language
“equality,” Maoist China was, in reality, unequal in some respects.19
This wisdom is insightful for understanding and studying socialist
China and the philosophy underlying its equal education laws. The
varied categorization of equality in those works, however, has left
the thread of the Mao-era conception of equality less clear. This
See, e.g., H. Arthur Steiner, Current “Mass Line” Tactics in Communist China, 45
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 422 (1951) (arguing that the Chinese Communist Party applied the
tactics of the mass line to almost all of its governance); Wen-hui Tsai, Mass Mobilization
Campaigns in Mao’s China, 6 AM. J. CHINESE STUD. 21 (1999) (outlining several mass
movements in the economic, political, and social spheres of Maoist China); Lin Chun,
Mass Line, in AFTERLIVES OF CHINESE COMMUNISM, supra note 15, at 121 (arguing that the
mass line was the CCP’s tool to seize and consolidate power).
18 See Donald Munro, Egalitarian Ideal and Educational Fact in Communist China,
in CHINA: MANAGEMENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY 256, 256–58 (John Lindbeck ed.,
1971) (relating Mao’s quest for the egalitarian ideal to the mass line); Emily Hannum,
Political Change and the Urban-Rural Gap in Basic Education in China, 1949–1990, 43
COMP. EDUC. REV. 193 (1999) (arguing that the educational policies of the Mao era,
especially during the Cultural Revolution, were egalitarian, as they reduced the urban-rural
gap in education); Lin, supra note 17, at 121, 124 (discussing the egalitarian implications
of economic democracy, an important manifestation of the mass line, as exemplified by the
Angang Constitution—managers joining shop-floor workers in their labors and workers
partaking in factory management).
19 See MAURICE MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER 124–26, 178 (3rd ed. 1999)
(arguing that despite the egalitarian drive being a major aim of Maoist policies, Chinese
industrialization led to the emergence of new patterns of inequality); Richard Curt Kraus,
The Limits of Maoist Egalitarianism, 16 ASIAN SURV. 1081 (1976) (arguing that the
equality advocated by Maoist programs was essentially symbolic in nature, a “mask[ing]
[of] factual inequalities with a formal equality”); Martin King Whyte, Rethinking Equality
and Inequality in the PRC, in THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY CONFERENCE FOR THE FAIRBANK
CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN RESEARCH (2005), at 6–17, available at
https://datascience.iq.harvard.edu/files/wcfia/files/1068_mkw_rethinkingequality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UC6Y-XMST] (arguing that despite the small disparity in personal
fortunes, Mao-era China was an inegalitarian place due to intentional policy interventions
that aggravated social and many other cleavages).
17
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Article, in contrast, lifts that thread up to theorize on the
constitutional law of education and reframes Maoist egalitarianism.
Terming it workforce equality, the Article construes Maoist
egalitarianism as a large degree of equality of results for the sake of
the masses, that is, the workforce, and for the purpose of expanding
and empowering the workforce. This definition is neither a cliché
that socialism is all about equality of results, as in noting that
vertically there was a certain extent of equality of opportunity in
education before 1958, and that horizontally the urban-rural and
industrial-agricultural differences persisted throughout the Mao era;
nor is it an assertion that the masses benefited exclusively, as
intellectual elites, especially engineering specialists, were valued in
the 1950s and bureaucratic elites and their offspring were, in fact,
privileged in education in socialist China. 20 Rather, the reframing
evinces that workforce-oriented equality of outcome, dictated by the
goal of industrialization, was the dominant ethos of Maoist
egalitarianism.
Second, the Article provides a legal and indigenous
perspective to the study of equality ideas in China during the Mao
era and beyond. The massive and radical social transformation in
post-1949 China has attracted a great deal of popular and scholarly
attention. Among them are brilliant works that look into the
educational movements, the ill-fated intelligentsia, and their
underlying political rationale, 21 some particularly examining the
egalitarian implications and causality between educational reforms

20

See, e.g., JOEL ANDREAS, RISE OF THE RED ENGINEERS 61–83 (2009) (mentioning
that before the Cultural Revolution college graduates and the technical elite were very
welcome in industrial enterprises, despite the Red-over-expert structure); MEISNER, supra
note 19, at 125–26 (arguing that the new education system during the First Five-Year Plan
perpetuated privileged strata, including Party and government officials and the
technological intelligentsia); MARTIN KING WHYTE & WILLIAM L. PARISH, URBAN LIFE IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 46 (1985) (claiming that the children of administrative elite cadres
received privileged educational opportunities such as attending elite boarding schools by
the early 1960s); Julia Kwong, Is Everyone Equal before the System of Grades: Social
Background and Opportunities in China, 34 BRIT. J. SOC. 93, 93–96 (1983) (revealing that
the recommendation-based system of educational advancement during the Cultural
Revolution disproportionately selected the children of high-ranking officials).
21 E.g., THOMAS P. BERNSTEIN, UP TO THE MOUNTAINS AND DOWN TO THE VILLAGES
(1977); RUTH GAMBERG, RED AND EXPERT (1977); DONGPING HAN, THE UNKNOWN
CULTURAL REVOLUTION (2000); SUZANNE PEPPER, RADICALISM AND E DUCATION REFORM IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA (1996).
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and the changes in workforce demand. 22 Those works of political
science have provided invaluable information and insight into a
period when available and reliable resources were limited; however,
legal perspectives, particularly examining equality in education
through a constitutional lens, are missing. This Article, in contrast,
fills that academic gap.
By extensively marshaling the
constitutional laws, it reveals that the law of universal and laborcombined education empowered the masses, especially workers and
peasants, who had traditionally been educationally disadvantaged, to
become the workforce for industrialization. It also shows that at the
same time, intellectuals were coerced under those laws into
becoming industrial manual laborers, thus shedding new light on a
notion of workforce equality in which almost everyone was
disciplined into homogeneous workers through educational
regulations.
Furthermore, this Article adds a Chinese indigenous research
perspective to the purely Western legal concept of equality.
Traditionally, Chinese jurisprudential studies have urged using
western jurists’ equality theories to modernize the Chinese legal
system.23
Most studies have focused on employment
discrimination.24 Some researchers, mainly drawing on Western
legal practice, have also focused on the equal protection of the right
to education in China.25 Those legal scholars have laid the
22

Munro, supra note 18, at 272–79, 285–90, 295–96; LEO A. ORLEANS,
PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER AND EDUCATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA (1961); Joel Glassman,
Educational Reform and Manpower Policy in China, 1955–1958, 3 MOD. CHINA 259
(1977).
23 See, e.g., Zhang Hengshan (张恒山), Lun Zhengyi he Falü Zhengyi (论正义和法律
正义) [On Justice and Legal Justice], 8 FAZHI YU SHEHUI FAZHAN (法制与社会发展) [L.
& SOC’L DEV.] 23 (2002) (introducing the theories of Alexander Hamilton, John Rawls,
Plato, Cicero, Aristotle, etc.).
24 See, e.g., Zhou Wei (周伟), Lun Jinzhi Qishi (论禁止歧视) [On the Prohibition of
Discrimination], 28 XIANDAI FAXUE (现代法学) [MODERN L. SCI.] 68 (2006) (utilizing
antidiscrimination theory to discuss five famous cases of employment discrimination
regarding height, age, gender, and certain diseases).
25 See, e.g., YANG CHENGMING (杨成铭), SHOUJIAOYU QUAN DE C UJIN HE BAOHU (受
教育权的促进和保护) [THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION]
Ch. 5 (2004); Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), Qishi Haishi Jiupian Gaokao Luqu Fenshuxian de
Hexianxing
Jianyan
(歧视还是纠偏？──高考录取分数线差别的合宪性检验)
[Discrimination or Redress?: The Constitutionality of the Difference in Admission Score
Lines for College Entrance Examinations], 9 HUADONG ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (华东政
法大学学报) [ECUPL J.] 118 (2006); JIAOYU GONGPING DE FALÜ BAOHU YANJIU (教育公
平的法律保护研究) [STUDY ON THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF EDUCATIONAL EQUITY] 43–90
(Wang Xigen ed., 2012); DAXUE ZHAOSHENG YU XIANFA PINGDENG (大学招生与宪法平
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groundwork for improved institutional design and further research.
An indigenous perspective on equality, however, is mostly missing.
Yet there were a lot of equality-related ideas in ancient China that
profoundly influenced how the Chinese people and institutions
conceived of equality for millennia. These included “the worldstate is for the equality of all peoples (tianxia weigong)”26 and
“education for everyone without distinction of classes (youjiao
wulei).”27 Although those ideas have rarely been incorporated into
the contemporary Chinese legal system, indigenous and
contextualized understandings of equality persist. Based on the
primary-source legal-historical documents, the Article presents how
equality was viewed by those who held sovereignty, thus enriching
the study of equality in China by adding an indigenous dimension.
This approach to constitutional construction utilizing historical
sources also sheds light on the studies of equality and other
constitutional concepts in China today.
In order to answer the question of how educational equality
was conceived and practiced in the constitutional gaze of Mao-era
China, this Article presents its history in three parts. The first part
explores where the Maoist concept of educational equality came
from, that is, the constitutional goal that drove the idea of equalityas-empowerment. Upon the founding of the People’s Republic, the
Communist Party of China (CCP) established the goal of
industrialization, divided into socialist revolution and socialist
reconstruction, with which the equal education laws were in line.
The second part examines how the Maoist egalitarianism in
education worked, elaborating on the legal embodiment of equalityas-empowerment and the engagement of workforce equality with
industrialization. The new regime included the disadvantaged in its
educational programs through universal mass education, and
imposed a combination of education and productive labor, thereby
empowering them to become industrial laborers. The third part
traces where the Maoist view of educational equality was going,
namely the consequences and implications of the constitutional
conception of workforce equality. Maoist equality of results led to
等) [UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITY] (Zhang Qianfan & Qu
Xiangfei eds., 2011) (so far the only study on educational inequality entirely through a
constitutional approach).
26 THE BOOK OF RITES, LIYUN [THE CONVEYANCE OF RITES], Ch. 9.
27 THE ANALECTS, WEI LING G ONG, Ch. 39.
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an unprecedented supply of education and to a considerable gap
between education and employment that the authorities sought to
bridge, both of which had important impacts on market-oriented
reforms in the post-Mao era.

I. THE GOAL OF INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION
The goal of industrialization in post-war China was a
common aspiration of the Chinese people and political parties after
a hundred years of social disturbance, political instability, and
intellectual anarchy since the late imperial era. In the official
narrative, this once glorious civilization, after its encounter with the
West in the mid-nineteenth century, was plunged into extreme
poverty and nearly lost its independence due to lagging civil and
military industries.28 The communist leaders, with Mao Zedong at
the helm, blamed a century of suffering on the fact that “those who
fall behind get beaten,”29 and were eager to defend independence,
get rid of poverty, and establish a socialist system. 30 As a result, at
the Political Consultative Conference in late September 1949,
immediately prior to the establishment of the regime, the CCP
together with other political parties set the constitutional goal of
industrialization in the interim Constitution: “The People’s Republic
of China must . . . steadily transform the country from an
agricultural into an industrial one.” 31 That objective was reaffirmed
in the subsequent official Constitution of 1954, where it was termed
“socialist industrialization of the country.” 32
The choice of industrialization as the constitutional goal in
the early years of the People’s Republic was attributed to a number
of factors. First, the nascent communist regime was under
28 See, e.g., 5 MAO ZEDONG, The Chinese People Have Stood Up! (Sept. 21, 1949), in
SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 15, 15–18 (1977).
29 See Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, The Tasks of Business Executives: Speech
Delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry
(Feb. 4, 1931), Speech at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist
Industry,
available
at
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1931/02/04.htm
[https://perma.cc/afb7-b6w5] (putting forward the notion that “those who fall behind get
beaten”).
30 See infra pp. 8–10.
31 GONGTONG G ANGLING, supra note 8, art. 3.
32 XIANFA pmbl. ¶ 2 (1954).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss2/3

2022]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

293

tremendous influence of Marxist theory and the experience of the
Soviet Union. Theoretically, Marxism implied that industrialization
was the premise and foundation of communism. It suggested that
“[t]he great industry made it absolutely necessary to establish an
entirely new social organization,” in which “[t]he proletariat
w[ould] use its political supremacy to . . . increase the total
productive forces as rapidly as possible.” 33 Practically, the Stalinist
economic model, which gave great priority to the development of
industry, was a success. A faithful follower of the U.S.S.R. at that
time, Mao and other CCP leaders were remarkably uncritical in
accepting the transplantation of the Soviet model in China. 34 The
Chinese First Five-Year plan of 1953–57, in particular, was a close
imitation of the Soviet First Five-Year plan of 1928–32, both of
which were aimed at rapid industrialization with special emphasis
on heavy industry.35 Given the perception that the imbalance in the
industrial structure of China, where heavy industry accounted for
only around 20% of the total industrial GDP in 1950,36 had been
greater than that of the Soviet Union, the CCP’s overemphasis on
heavy industry was exacerbated. 37
Second, as the communist regime faced military challenges
near and far after coming to power, rapid industrialization,
especially the raising of the military industry, became an imperative
for it in the 1950s. On the one hand, despite its retreat to Taiwan
after losing the civil war of 1945–49, the Kuomintang (KMT or
Nationalist Party) still maintained a strong military presence in the
33

1 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in
MARX/ENGELS SELECTED WORKS 98–137 (Samuel Moore trans., Progress Publishers 1969)
(1848),
available
at
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/fct2-shhh].
34 MEISNER, supra note 19, at 109–11.
35 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, COMPARISON OF THE F IRST FIVE YEAR PLANS OF
COMMUNIST
CHINA
AND
THE
USSR
(June
1959),
available
at
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000313443.pdf
[https://perma.cc/phf5-88qf].
36
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO JINGJI DANG’AN ZILIAO X UANBIAN 1949–1952
ZONGHE JUAN (中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编, 1949–1952, 综合卷) [ECONOMIC
ARCHIVES DATA OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949–1952, SYNTHETIC STUDY
VOLUME] 65 (Chinese Acad. Soc. Sci. & the Nat’l Archives Admin. eds., 1990)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC ARCHIVES] (indicating that the three major heavy industrial
sectors—steel, coal, and electricity—only accounted for 6–8% of the industrial GDP,
respectively).
37 MEISNER, supra note 19, at 112.
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Mainland, especially in the South. The Nationalists, according to
Mao, were “resort[ing] to bandit guerrilla warfare,” “sabotaging the
people’s economic undertakings,” and “assassinating the personnel
of the Party and government organizations.” 38 The nascent
communist regime, therefore, was threatened and eager to
strengthen its military power to “consolidate national defense” and
“liberate Taiwan.”39 On the other hand, founded in the context of
the Cold War, the communist regime saw itself as hostile and
threatened by capitalist countries. As a significant member of the
socialist camp and a close Soviet ally, the CCP felt obligated to
build up its military industry in order to form and guard “an
international united front.”40 More importantly, Mao’s anticipation
of a possible third world war, confirmed by the Korean War, made
the military industry a high, if not the top, priority. 41
Third, industrialization, especially of civilian industries, was
a compelling need for socialist economic construction. For one
thing, China was traditionally an agricultural country, with 93% of
its population living in rural areas in 1949. 42 In order to establish a
people’s democratic dictatorship, the CCP had to first realize the
socialization of agriculture through educating the peasantry who
were economically dispersed. Mao held that “[t]he steps to
socialize agriculture must be co-ordinated with the development of a
powerful industry,” therefore, national industrialization was
essential for achieving socialism. 43 For another, China’s industrial
productivity was almost at its lowest point in 1949. 44 The modern
industrial base of China during the KMT’s rule was mainly built
under foreign imperialist auspices, relied heavily on external
38 MAO ZEDONG, Fight for A Fundamental Turn for the Better in the Nation’s
Financial and Economic Situation (June 6, 1950), in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG,
supra note 28, at 26, 27.
39 Id. at 30.
40 4 MAO ZEDONG, On People’s Democratic Dictatorship (July 1, 1949), in SELECTED
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 411, 415 (1961).
41 MAO, supra note 28, at 26.
42
See Chen Bin (陈彬), Woguo Chengzhenhua Fazhan de Lishi yu Weilai Qushi (我
国城镇化发展的历史与未来趋势) [The History and Future Trend of China’s
Urbanization], GUOJIA XINXI ZHONGXIN (国家信息中心) [ST. INFO. CENT.] (Apr. 8, 2016),
http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/455/6167.htm. [https://perma.cc/j2kx-3p7e].
43 MAO, supra note 40, at 419.
44 See ECONOMIC ARCHIVES, supra note 36, at 65 (enumerating that compared with
those of the best years in terms of annual industrial output, China in 1949 produced only
one-tenth of the iron, one-sixth of the steel, and less than half of the coal).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol17/iss2/3

2022]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

295

economic relations,45 and required massive imports of raw
materials.46 Faced with a weak and constrained industry, the CCP
thus opted for rapid industrialization by self-reliance (zili
gengsheng) for independence and economic development. 47 That
desire for self-sufficiency in industrial supply became more urgent
after the U.S. trade embargo on China in 1950 following the entry
of Chinese troops into the Korean War and the Sino-Soviet rift in
1960.48 Realizing that “there w[ould] probably be a period of peace
for a decade or more” in 1956, Mao further shifted the focus of
industrialization from military to civilian industries.49
In this regard, the new regime continued to emphasize the
constitutional objective of industrialization in the early years of its
existence.
The interim Constitution of 1949, the Common
Programme, professed to “lay the foundation for the
industrialization of the country” mainly through a “planned,
systematic rehabilitation and development of heavy industry.”50
The First Five-Year Plan, which served as the economic constitution
of the time, particularly emphasized the need for socialist
industrialization and the “socialist transformation of agriculture,
handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce.” 51
The
Constitution of 1954 declared, for the first time, that the socialist
industrialization and transformation of agriculture and industry were
the “fundamental task of the State.” 52 Heavy industry was then
designated as “the chief index” of socialist industrialization and “the

45

MEISNER, supra note 19, at 107.
ECONOMIC ARCHIVES, supra note 36, at 40.
47 3 MAO ZEDONG, We Must Learn to Do Economic Work (Jan. 10, 1945), in
SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 189, 191 (1967).
48 Report by the Department of Commerce of Actions Taken by the Department of
Commerce, in Consultation with the Departments of State and Defense and Other
Government Agencies, on Trade with China (Dec. 4, 1950), in FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1950, EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 672–73, available at
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1950v06/reference/frus.frus1950v06.i0009.pd
f.
49 MAO ZEDONG, On the Ten Major Relationships (Apr. 25, 1956), in SELECTED
WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 28, at 284, 287.
50 GONGTONG G ANGLING, supra note 8, art. 35.
51 FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN 1953–1957, at 15–17 (Foreign Languages Press 1956).
52 XIANFA pmbl., ¶ 2 (1954).
46
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basis for a strong economy and national defen[s]e,”53 followed by
the bold Great Leap Forward (1958–62).54
In 1958, the CCP adopted a radical approach to rapid
industrialization, aiming to outnumber the U.K. and the U.S. in
industrial products in the shortest possible time. 55 That campaign
for communism, however, far from improving the quality of
industrialization, caused a severe ecological catastrophe and led
directly to the Great Famine in 1958–61.56 The CCP thus adjusted
the goal of rapid industrialization, changing its one-sided focus on
heavy industry and stressing the importance of light industry and
agriculture, and proposed the “high-speed and balanced advance of
socialist industrialization.”57 The Cultural Revolution that followed,
while claiming to be “a powerful motive force for the development
of the social productive forces,” 58 disrupted the normal economic
and social order in China, setting aside the constitutional objective
of industrialization. The Constitution of 1975 was thus silent on
this issue except to state that industry was the “leading factor” in the

53 PROPOSALS OF THE EIGHTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
CHINA FOR THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY,
1958–1962, at 13 (Foreign Languages Press 1956) [hereinafter PROPOSAL FOR THE SECOND
FIVE-YEAR PLAN].
54
Editorial, Xianqi Nongye Shengchan de Xin Gaochao (掀起农业生产的新高潮) [A
New Upsurge in Agricultural Production], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY],
NOV. 13, 1957, at 1 (becoming the first to propose a “great leap forward” on the production
front).
55 Editorial, Wei Shixian Shehui Zhuyi Jianshe de Zongluxian er Fendou (为实现社会
主义建设的总路线而奋斗) [Fight for the Realization of the General Line of Socialist
Construction], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], May 25, 1958, at 1. The
timeline for outrunning British industrial output changed from fifteen years to seven years
and finally to two years in the two months between April and June 1958. See 7 JIANGUO
YILAI MAO ZEDONG WENGAO (建国以来毛泽东文稿) [MAO ZEDONG’S MANUSCRIPTS
SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE PRC] 222, 236, 278 (CCP Cent. Res. Off. ed., 1992)
[hereinafter MAO ZEDONG’S MANUSCRIPTS].
56 CARL RISKIN, CHINA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY: THE QUEST FOR DEVELOPMENT SINCE
1949, at 136 (1987).
57 Po I-Po, The Socialist Industrialization of China, 6(41) PEKING REV. 6, 8 (1963),
available at https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1963/PR1963-41.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YT32-26N6].
58 Guanyu Wuchan Jieji Wenhua Dageming de Jueding (关于无产阶级文化大革命
的决定) [Decision Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution] (promulgated by
the CCPCC, Aug. 8, 1966, effective Aug. 8, 1966), art. 14, translated in DECISION OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY CONCERNING THE GREAT
PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION (Foreign Languages Press 1966) [hereinafter
Decision on Cultural Revolution].
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socialist economy,59 and it was not until the end of the Cultural
Revolution that it was restored to the Constitution of 1978 as one of
the four modernizations.60
The goal of industrialization, in line with the Marxist
dialectic, was divided into two aspects to be accomplished. 61 One
was, corresponding to the economic basis, socialist reconstruction,
the core requirement of which could be described as “expert.” The
other was a socialist revolution, corresponding to the superstructure,
with “red” as its vital imperative. “Red” meant ideologically
trustworthy, and “expert” referred to technically competent. To
achieve rapid industrialization, redness and expertise were both
emphasized. For expertise, the communists were fully aware of the
indispensability of a literate and technically competent populace to
the all-out national construction. 62 Redness, on the other hand,
guaranteed loyalty to the communist regime and the total
commitment of the population to industrialization. 63
This
juxtaposition was aptly described as the debate of “red vs. expert.”
The tug-of-war between the two lasted throughout the Mao era, with
each holding various degrees of sway over the other at any
particular time.64 Roughly put, the first half of the Mao era was a
time that favored expertise, while redness weighed much more since
the mid-1960s.65
Education, obviously, was vital to imparting both the “red”
and “expert” needed for industrialization, and was by all means
subordinated to the constitutional goal of industrialization.66 The
aim of the educational policy of the communist regime was, in
Mao’s words, to produce more than a sufficient workforce with
59

XIANFA art. 10 (1975).
XIANFA pmbl., ¶ 4 (1978).
61 See XIN REN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE TRADITION 53 (1997)
(explaining the Marxist dialectics as the economic basis determining the superstructure and
Mao’s contribution of highlighting the impact of the superstructure on the economic basis).
See also 2 MAO ZEDONG, On New Democracy (Jan. 9, 1940), in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO
TSE-TUNG 339, 340–42 (1965) (claiming that the form of culture, as other ideological
forms, is first determined by the political and economic form, and then influences the
latter).
62 CHINESE EDUCATION UNDER COMMUNISM 32 (Chang-Tu Hu ed., 1962).
63 THE MAKING OF A MODEL CITIZEN IN COMMUNIST CHINA 8 (Charles Price Ridley et
al. eds., 1971).
64 Louis R. Smerling, Admissions, in CHINA’S SCHOOLS IN FLUX 95 (Ronald N.
Montaperto & Jay Henderson eds., 1979).
65 See infra Part II.
66 THE MAKING OF A MODEL C ITIZEN IN COMMUNIST CHINA, supra note 63, at 24.
60
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socialist consciousness. 67 On the one hand, education made it
possible to speed up the process of industrialization by enabling
prospective workers to become technically competent. On the other
hand, ideological indoctrination increased workers’ motivation and
productivity, thus facilitating the acceleration of industrialization.
Therefore, in order to achieve the constitutional goal, the CCP under
Mao revolutionized education, through which a critical mass of
people, especially the previously excluded, were empowered to
become qualified socialist industrial workers.

II. CONCEIVING WORKFORCE EQUALITY: EMPOWERING
WORKERS THROUGH EDUCATION
In contrast to the quest for equality of “men” that many
Western revolutionaries placed foremost in their declarations, 68 the
early CCP’s understanding of equality, probably influenced in part
by Sun Yat-sen,69 was conceptually vague and explicitly utilitarian.
Considering equality in the Western sense as the “decadent and
reactionary world outlook of the bourgeoisie,” 70 the CCP under Mao
never saw equality as an individual right, but a collective privilege.
During the Republican era, what the communists termed “equality”
was the claim for the CCP to gain equal status with the KMT, 71 the
independence and equality of China relative to foreign countries,72
67

MAO ZEDONG, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Feb.
27, 1957), in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, supra note 28, at 384, 405.
68 E.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); T HE DECLARATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND THE CITIZEN art. 1 (1789) (Fr.).
69 See SUN YAT-SEN, PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SAVING CHINA 277 (Julie Lee Wei et al. eds.,
Julie Lee Wei et al. trans., 1994) (“The bounds of equality and liberty may lie in disputes
between our own nation and a foreign nation or disputes between our own party and
another party. Here there should be equality and freedom. But we cannot say that within
our own country or within our own party everyone must have equality and liberty.”). Mao
quoted Sun’s Testament and the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT
about a hundred times in his speeches.
70 Editorial, Sidiao Zichan Jieji Ziyou Pingdeng Boai de Zhexiubu (撕掉资产阶级”
自由、平等、博爱”的遮羞布) [Tear Aside the Bourgeois Mask of “Liberty, Equality,
and Fraternity], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], June 4, 1966, at 1.
71 MAO, The Question of Independence and Initiative within the United Front (Nov. 5,
1938), The Demands on the Kuomintang (Feb 1, 1940), supra note 61, at 215–16, 395–
400; MAO, On Coalition Government (Apr. 24, 1945), supra note 47, at 205, 213
[hereinafter MAO, On Coalition Government]; MAO, On the Chungking Negotiations (Oct.
17, 1945), supra note 40, at 53, 55.
72 MAO, On Coalition Government, supra note 71, at 256–58; MAO, Manifesto of the
Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Oct., 1947), supra note 40, at 147, 150 [hereinafter
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and the equality and autonomy of the minority nationalities relative
to the Han Chinese.73 After coming to power, although equality was
enshrined in the constitutions and the agrarian reform partially
realized the ideal of “equalization of landownership” and “land to
the tiller,”74 the CCP conceived of equality as only a privilege
granted on the basis of group identity—the peasantry, youth, and
women.
Those groups, however, did not enjoy equality under the law
in all respects without distinction—their equal status was
emphasized only to the extent that it served the constitutional goal
of industrialization. Women, for example, were constantly being
underlined in the 1940s and 1950s as being “on an equal footing” in
order to mobilize their participation “in all work useful to the war
effort” and productive activity. 75 In other words, equality was a
means used by the CCP for the empowerment of more people,
especially those who had been unable to engage in production either
due to the law or their capacity, to dedicate to industrialization.
Moreover, industrialization was so overwhelmingly important in
pre-Cultural Revolution Maoist China that the regime would allow
it to be achieved at the expense of inequalities for all but the
working class. Mao put it bluntly in 1953 that Confucianism
preached “policy of benevolence” (shi renzheng), but that there
would be two kinds of “policies of benevolence:”76
Industrialization was a greater benevolence and improving the
MAO, Manifesto of the PLA]; MAO, Cast Away Illusions, Prepare for Struggle (Aug. 14,
1949), supra note 40, at 425, 427–28.
73 MAO, Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front (Mar. 11,
1949), supra note 61, at 421, 429; MAO, On Coalition Government, supra note 71, at 255–
56; MAO, Manifesto of the PLA, supra note 72, at 150.
74 GONGTONG GANGLING, supra note 8, arts. 6 & 9; XIANFA arts. 58 & 85 (1954);
Tudi Gaige Fa (土地改革法) [Agrarian Reform Law] (promulgated by the Cent. People’s
Gov’t, June 28, 1950, effective June 28, 1950), CLI.1.129481 (Lawinfochina); 2 LIU
SHAOQI, Report on the Question of Agrarian Reform (June 14, 1950), in SELECTED WORKS
OF LIU SHAOQI 35, 38–40 (1991).
75 MAO, On Coalition Government, supra note 71, at 238; MAO, Editor’s Notes from
Socialist Upsurge in China’s Countryside, supra note 28, at 242, 269 [hereinafter MAO,
Editor’s Notes]; Guanyu Jiancha Hunyin Fa Zhixing Qingkuang de Zhishi (关于检查婚姻
法执行情况的指示) [The Instruction on the Inspection of the Implementation of the
Marriage Law] (promulgated by the Gov’t Admin. Council, Sept. 26, 1951, effective Sept.
26, 1951) RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Sept. 29, 1951, at 1 (stating that
women, having been given equal rights, “became more active in political activities and
various construction projects of the new society”).
76 MAO, Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and
Our Future Tasks (Sept. 12, 1953), supra note 28, at 115, 119.
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peasants’ livelihood was a lesser benevolence; prioritizing the latter
over the former would “go off the right track,”77 and equalizing the
earnings of the workers and peasants would “spell the destruction of
China’s industry.”78 That said, in pursuit of industrialization, only
those who belonged to groups that had more use, namely the
industrial workforce, could enjoy equality; others, however, could
not. Equality, therefore, from the constitutional perspective of
communist China, was for the workforce and for the making of a
larger workforce.
The constitutional objective of industrialization was supreme
in education as well. In 1950, Qian Junrui, the then Vice-Minister
of Education, proclaimed that education was “to serve production
and construction,”79 and specifically stated that “China’s
educational policy [wa]s primarily serving the working class and the
peasantry, not the people in general.” 80 Although the alliance of the
workers and peasants constituted 80 to 90% of the total
population,81 that claim arguably showed that the empowerment
through education was a privilege only for those who worked for
industry and agricultural industry and their offspring.82 Thus, equal
education, in the understanding of the communist leaders who
profoundly shaped the constitutional vision, was the education to
which the masses of workers and peasants were entitled and which
would prepare them to better contribute to industrialization.
Equality in education, as such, was conceived as the right of the
laboring people, on a group basis, to an equal access to a uniform,
production-oriented educational programme. This constitutional
conception of educational equality, which was meant to empower
the masses of workers and peasants through education in order to
produce large numbers of skilled industrial labor, was workforce
equality. It virtually permeated the speeches of the Mao-era
communist leaders and the education laws, including both the
77

Id.
MAO, Criticism of Liang Shu-Ming’s Reactionary Ideas (Sept. 16–18, 1953), supra
note 28, at 121, 127.
79 Chien Chun-jui, Vice-Minister Educ., The Policy of Educational Construction in
Present-Day China, in CULTURE AND EDUCATION IN NEW CHINA 21, 29–35 (1950).
80 Id. at 21.
81 MAO, supra note 40, at 421.
82 See Chien, supra note 79, at 28–29 (claiming that workers and peasants and their
children were “more entitled to a higher education than others because they [we]re the
mainstay of the state and the backbone of construction.”).
78
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popularization of education and the combination of education and
production.
A. Popularizing Education for the Masses
The first step towards educational equality as envisaged by
the constitutional actors was to make education, in any form,
accessible to the masses of workers and peasants, hence universal
education. The regime’s ambition to transform China from an
agrarian to an industrial nation required massive supplies of workers
at a time when the country featured a largely rural and illiterate
population. The illiteracy rate in 1949 was as high as 80%, with the
remaining literate population including semi-literates who could
read only a few hundred Chinese characters. 83 Moreover, the
majority of those illiterates were workers and peasants, “the
fundamental force of the leading classes of New China.” 84
Thereupon, providing the masses of the working people, who had
been denied such opportunities, with equal education to enable them
to become qualified industrial workers turned out to be the way to
achieve rapid industrialization. The constitutional conception of
educational equality, which was for the workforce and for the
making of a larger workforce, thus dictated education laws for
universal mass education, particularly for workers and peasants.
Education in traditional China, although rooted in the
Confucian principle of no distinction among the classes and
designed as the sole criterion for upward mobility, was in practice
available to a small group of the population, primarily the offspring
of the gentry and literati.85 In the first half of the twentieth century,
various efforts by authorities in that war-torn country made limited
progress in extending education to the less-privileged segments of
the population.86 Arguably, the most far-reaching of those was the
Beiyang government’s Decree of School System Reform Plan in

83

14 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA 186 (Roderick MacFarquhar & John K.
Fairbank eds., 1987).
84 Chien, supra note 79, at 27–28.
85 See, e.g., BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, CIVIL E XAMINATIONS AND MERITOCRACY IN L ATE
IMPERIAL CHINA 126–46 (2013) (arguing that the gentry-merchant elites in late imperial
China monopolized the cultural resources to qualify the Civil Examinations and hence the
access to the imperial bureaucracy).
86 ORLEANS, supra note 22, at 9.
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1922,87 promoted by the Chinese National Association for the
Advancement of Education along American lines. 88 The Chinese
school system was accordingly reorganized from a Japanese 7-4
system (seven years in primary school, four years in secondary
school) to an American 6-3-3 system (six years in primary school,
three years each in junior and senior high schools), which has been
used to this day despite several adjustments.89 A hybrid secondary
education system consisting of both general and vocational schools
became the new norm. 90 In addition, higher education grew during
the Republican period, increasing the number of institutions from
115 in 1912 to 185 in 1946. 91 Years of warfare left those reforms
largely on paper. Compulsory education for the population at large
was never accomplished.
Having served in James Yen’s Mass Education Movement
and the Guangzhou Peasants Movement Training Institute, Mao
strongly believed that education should meet the needs of the
peasants and other lower-class working people.92 The CCP thus
developed the Yan’an model rudimentary education during the
Chinese Civil War, which encouraged “people-managed,
government-assisted” (minban guanzhu) schools and one to threeyear primary schools. 93 Mao articulated his belief as education
belonging to the broad masses and, accordingly, that written
Chinese must be reformed and the spoken language must be
“brought closer to that of the people.” 94 That commitment to

87

PEPPER, supra note 21, at 61.
CHINESE EDUCATION UNDER COMMUNISM, supra note 62, at 21.
89 Yang Dongping (杨东平), Zhongguo Jiaoyu Zhidu he Jiaoyu Zhengce de Bianqian
(中国教育制度和教育政策的变迁) [The Changes of China’s Education System and
Education
Policy],
CUHK
Universities
Services
Ctr.
China
Studies,
http://ww2.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/PaperCollection/Details.aspx?id=4118[https://perma.cc/H4PC8W82].
90 Id.
91 DI ERCI ZHONGGUO JIAOYU NIANJIAN (第二次中國教育年鑑) [THE SECOND
EDUCATIONAL YEARBOOK OF CHINA] 1400 (Ministry of Educ. Yearbook Compilation
Comm. ed., 1948).
92 See, e.g., CHARLES WISHART H AYFORD, TO THE PEOPLE, at xiii (1990); Gerald W.
Berkley, The Canton Peasant Movement Training Institute, 1 MOD. CHINA 161, 161–63,
165–66 (1975); 1 MAO ZEDONG, Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in
Hunan (Mar. 1927), in SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 23–56 (1965).
93 Ronald N. Montaperto, China’s Education in Perspective, in CHINA’ S SCHOOLS IN
FLUX, supra note 64, at 1, 10.
94 MAO, supra note 61, at 381–82.
88
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universal education was then endorsed by the Constitution, 95
according to which the new government made it a priority to open
the doors of education to the workers and peasants. 96 Thus, with the
administrative rule of the 1951 Decision on Reforming the School
System, the socialist education reform commenced.97 The rationale
for that reform, as Qian explained, was first to ensure access to
education for those of working-class origin, and second to build a
workforce capable of engaging in national reconstruction in large
numbers.98
Embracing that concept of mass-oriented workforce
equality, the communist regime devoted a substantial budget to
education in the first decade after its establishment to carry out
popular education campaigns. 99
Mass education was given
considerable importance, ascribed not only to the training of a
critical mass of literate and skilled workers needed for socialist
reconstruction,100 but also to its being regarded more than schooling
as the indoctrination, propaganda, and agitation that the socialist
revolution required.101 Faced with the elitist liberal education
system inherited from the KMT, one of the first tasks of the CCP,
which had pledged to sweep away all traditional privileges and
inequalities, was to extend education to the masses.102 Of those,
apart from the workers, a particular concern for equality in
education during the Mao era was the peasants, an extremely large

95

GONGTONG GANGLING, supra note 8, art. 47.
Id. See also 2 ZHOU ENLAI, Speech at a National Conference on Higher Education
(June 8, 1950), in SELECTED WORKS OF ZHOU ENLAI 25, 26 (1989) (interpreting the
educational policies in the Common Programme).
97 Guanyu Gaige Xuezhi de Jueding (关于改革学制的决定) [Decision on Reforming
the School System] (promulgated by the Gov’t Admin. Council, Oct. 1, 1951, effective
Oct. 1, 1951), CLI.2.159995 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Decision on Reforming the
School System].
98 Qian Junrui (钱俊瑞), Gaodeng Jiaoyu Gaige de Guanjian (高等教育改革的关键)
[The Key to the Reform of Higher Education], 4 RENMIN JIAOYU (人民教育) [PEOPLE’S
EDUC.] 6, 6 (1951).
99
See, e.g., Li Xiannian (李先念), Vice Primer & Minister Fin., Report at the Fifth
Session of the First National People’s Congress (Feb. 1, 1958), in RENMIN RIBAO (人民日
报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Feb. 12, 1958, at 3 (allocating 8.63% of the national budget into
education in 1958).
100 Montaperto, supra note 93, at 7.
101 See Theodore Hsi-en Chen, Education and Propaganda in Communist China, 277
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 135 (1951).
102 See, e.g., MAO, supra note 61, at 381–82; Chien, supra note 79, at 22–23, 25–26.
96
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group to be engaged in the socialist industrialization. 103 As a means
of equipping the working people with knowledge and skills in the
service of industrialization, the first batch of education laws in
communist China developed a mass education that was popular,
short-term, and close to productive life. 104
First and foremost, the new authorities launched a
tremendous campaign to eradicate illiteracy. Highlighting its
importance in the communist political program, the CCP established
the Chinese Written Language Reform Association only ten days
after taking power, which subsequently became a committee
directly under the State Council. 105 In the early stages of that
campaign, Qi Jianhua, an instructor in the Army, created a “Quick
Literacy Method” that reduced the time needed to learn Chinese
characters from three years to three hundred hours through phonetic
reading symbols.106 Qi’s method was soon introduced nationwide
by the Ministry of Education and the All-China Congress of Trade
Unions.107
More than seven million workers and peasants
participated in the “Quick Literacy Method” program in 1953
alone.108 In 1956, the Central Committee of the CCP (CCPCC) and
the State Council jointly issued a high-level decree entitled Decision

103
MATTHIAS STIEFEL & WILLEM F. WERTHEIM, PRODUCTION, EQUALITY AND
PARTICIPATION IN RURAL CHINA 83 (1983).
104 Xue Lan Rong & Tianjian Shi, Inequality in Chinese Education, 10 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 107, 108 (2001). See also RONALD F. PRICE, MARX AND EDUCATION IN RUSSIA AND
CHINA 163–219 (1977).
105 Ministry of Educ. Dep’t of Language & Info. Mgmt., Xin Zhongguo Chuqi Yuyan
Wenzi Gongzuo Zhongyao Dashi (新中国初期语言文字工作重要大事) [Important Events
in the Language and Written Chinese Work in the Early Years of the New China],
MINISTRY
OF
EDUC.
(July
25,
2006),
http://www.moe.gov.cn/s78/A18/s8357/moe_808/tnull_14054.html
[https://perma.cc/86Z5-XVAG].
106 See, e.g., ZHONGGUO J IAOYU NIANJIAN (中国教育年鉴1949–1981) [CHINA
EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981] 577 (Zhang Jian ed., 1984) [hereinafter CHINA
EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981]; Nat J. Colletta, Worker Education: Revolution and
Reform, in EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 134, 138
(John N. Hawkins ed., 1983).
107 CHINA E DUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 576–77; Guanyu zai
Gongren Qunzhong zhong Tuixing Sucheng Shizifa Kaizhan Saochu Wenmang Yundong
de Zhishi (关于在工人群众中推行速成识字法开展扫除文盲运动的指示) [Instruction
on Promoting Illiteracy Campaigns through the ‘Quick Literacy Method’ among the
Workers] (promulgated by the All-China Cong. of Trade Unions, Sept. 6, 1952, effective
Sept. 6, 1952), RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Sept. 9, 1952, at 1.
108 CHINA EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 577–78.
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on Eradicating Illiteracy,109 making it “an extremely important
political task.”110 Since then, the government mandated literacy
measures on a larger scale, promoting successively a standard
official Chinese Mandarin, 111 the simplification and phoneticization
of Chinese characters. 112 Designed to reduce barriers to education
“in the interest of the masses,”113 these projects, despite the
backlash,114 had the firm support of then-Premier Zhou Enlai and
other party leaders.115 Those mass literacy measures were thus
continued and turned out to be successful, with the rate of illiteracy
and semi-illiteracy declining to 45.6% in 1964, and 28.3% in
1982,116 significantly improving the educational profile of China’s
workforce.
The literacy campaign was the culmination of the view of
equality for the workforce; in the face of the urgent quest for
109 Guanyu Saochu Wenmang de Jueding (关于扫除文盲的决定) [Decision on
Eradicating Illiteracy] (promulgated by the CCP Cent. Comm. & the St. Council, Mar. 29,
1956, effective Mar. 29, 1956), CLI.16.161042 (Lawinfochina).
110 Id. ¶ 1.
111 See, e.g., Guanyu zai Zhongxue Xiaoxue he Geji Shifan Xuexiao Dali Tuiguang
Putonghua de Zhishi (关于在中学、小学和各级师范学校大力推广普通话的指示)
[Directives on the Promotion of Mandarin in Secondary Schools, Primary Schools, and
Normal Schools at All Levels] (promulgated by the Ministry of Educ., Nov. 17, 1955,
effective Nov. 17, 1955), CLI.4.183187 (Lawinfochina); Guanyu Tuiguang Putonghua de
Zhishi (关于推广普通话的指示) [Directives on Promoting Mandarin] (promulgated by
the St. Council, Feb. 20, 1956, effective Feb. 20, 1956), CLI.2.108 (Lawinfochina).
112 See, e.g., Guanyu Gongbu Hanzi Jianhua Fang’an de Jueyi (关于公布汉字简化方
案的决议) [Resolution on Revealing the Simplified Chinese Character Program]
(promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 28, 1956, effective Jan. 28, 1956), CLI.2.104
(Lawinfochina); Guanyu Hanyu Pinyin Fang’an de Jueyi (关于汉语拼音方案的决议)
[Resolution on the Scheme for a Chinese Phonetic Alphabet] (promulgated by the Nat’l
People’s Cong., Feb. 11, 1958, effective Feb. 11, 1958), CLI.1.10877 (Lawinfochina).
113 ZHOU, Current Tasks for the Reform of the Chinese Language (Jan. 10, 1958),
supra note 96, at 287, 289.
114 See, e.g., Harriet C. Mills, Language Reform in China: Some Recent Developments,
15 FAR E. Q. 517, 519–20 (1956) (listing some criticisms and fears about the proposed
phoneticization and character simplifications).
115 See, e.g., ZHOU, supra note 113, at 287–300; Wu Yuzhang (吴玉章), Director,
Chinese Written Language Reform Comm., Guanyu Dangqian Wenzi Gaige Gongzuo He
Hanyu Pinyin Fangan De Baogao—Yijiu Wuba Nian Er Yue San Ri Zai Diyijie Qquanguo
Renmin Daibiao Dahui Di Wuci Huiyi Shang (关于当前文字改革工作和汉语拼音方案
的报告—一九五八年二月三日在第一届全国人民代表大会第五次会议上) [Report on
Reform Proposals About Current Chinese Characters and Mandarin Pinyin—Report at the
Fifth Session of the First National People’s Congress (Feb. 3, 1958)], in RENMIN RIBAO
(人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Feb. 14, 1958, at 2.
116 CHINA S TATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1999, at 4-4 (Nat’l Bureau Stat. ed., 1999),
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1999e/d04e.htm
[https://perma.cc/A9L4-DJ57] .
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industrialization, especially since the Great Leap Forward, the
regime desired to make the education laws implement its vision of
equality for enhancing the workforce. To that end, the educational
authorities shortened the school year on one hand and increased the
number of schools and enrolments on the other. Firstly, following
the Yan’an model, the new regime shortened the schooling system
in order to deliver its limited educational resources to more people
and train more laborers in a shorter cycle. For instance, one of the
salient changes in the new school system established by the CCP in
1951 was the reduction in the length of primary schooling from six
years under the Nationalists to five years. 117 During the Great Leap
Forward campaign, the communist education leaders Lu Dingyi and
Yang Xiufeng explicitly blamed the unnecessary years of schooling
for hindering the development of education in a “greater, faster,
better, and more economical” (duo kuai hao sheng) manner.118 As a
result, the education authorities conducted many regional
experiments to shorten the school system. For example, arithmetic
was added to such lower grades as kindergarten, 119 several
elementary school courses in history and science were merged into
one,120 and difficult subjects, such as analytical geometry, were
removed from secondary school curricula. 121 Most importantly, this
period witnessed a direct reduction in the length of the full-time
primary and secondary school to approximately ten years.122 Lu
bluntly explained that this was because it took ten years for a six- or
117

Decision on Reforming the School System, supra note 97, art. 2.
Lu Ting-Yi, Director, the CCP Propaganda Dep’t, Our School System Must Be
Reformed, Speech at the Second Session of the Second National People’s Congress (Apr. 9,
1960), translated in CHINESE EDUCATION UNDER COMMUNISM, supra note 62, at 130, 136–
37; Yang Hsiu-Feng, Minister Educ., Actively Carry Out the Reform of the School System
to Bring About Greater, Faster, Better, and More Economical Results in the Development
of Education, Speech at the Second Session of the Second National People’s Congress
(Apr. 9, 1960), translated in CHINESE EDUCATION UNDER COMMUNISM, supra note 62, at
98, 103.
119 See Lu, supra note 118, at 134–35; Yang, supra note 118Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 104–05.
120 See Yang, supra note 118, at 105.
121
See Lu, supra note 118, at 134.
122 For example, a five-grade unified elementary school system experiment was carried
out by fifteen provinces and municipalities, including Heibei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin,
Heilongjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Heinan, and Guizhou. A
five-grade unified middle school system, or a three-year junior middle school and two-year
senior middle school system was carried out by six provinces, including Jilin, Shanxi,
Gansu, Jiangxi, Hunan, and Qinghai. And a ten-year unified elementary and middle school
system was carried out by Beijing and Henan provinces. See Id. at 136–37.
118
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seven-year-old schoolchild to grow into a full-fledged workforce at
the age of sixteen or seventeen, 123 suggesting that they saw
universal education as a way to turn young students into a
workforce as soon as possible.
Secondly, the authorities increased the number of schools
and enrolments to expand mass education and, consequently, the
size of the labor pool. In the first decade after the establishment of
the People’s Republic, a significant portion of the annual education
budget, which accounted for approximately 7% of the state budget,
was earmarked for the expansion of primary and secondary
schools.124 In 1958, in line with the leap forward in agriculture and
industry, one of the most important top-level education laws of the
Mao era, the Directives on Educational Work, set the goal of
popularizing primary education throughout the country within three
to five years and higher education within fifteen years. 125 Despite
the decline in the quality of education that resulted, universal
education in the pre-Cultural Revolution Mao era was remarkable
for its success in reaching out to the masses, especially those of
working-class origin.126 For example, the proportion of students
from working-class families to the total number of secondary school
students jumped from 51 to 75% only after the First Five-Year
plan.127 Those radical campaigns were briefly curtailed after 1962,
when an apparent redirection was set forth toward “quality
education,”128 but were soon intensified as the Cultural Revolution
ramped up.

123

Id. at 139.
ORLEANS, supra note 22, at 14–16.
125 Guanyu Jiaoyu Gongzuo de Zhishi (关于教育工作的指示) [Directives on
Educational Work] (promulgated by the CCP Cent. Comm. & the St. Council, Sept. 19,
1958, effective Sept. 19, 1958), art. 6, CLI.16.162955 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter
Directives on Educational Work].
126 See infra Figure 1.
127 WEIDA DE SHINIAN (伟大的十年) [TEN GREAT YEARS] 170 (Nat’l Bureau Stat. ed.,
1959).
128
Guanyu Youzhongdain de Banhao Yipi Quanrizhi Zhongxiao Xuexiao de Tongzhi
(关于有重点地办好一批全日制中、小学校的通知) [Circular on the Establishment of a
Number of Key-point Full-time Primary and Secondary Schools] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Educ., Dec. 21, 1962, effective Dec. 21, 1962), in CHINA EDUCATION
YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 736. See also Montaperto, supra note 93, at 26–
27 (discussing key-point schools that “received the best that China had to offer in terms of
staff, facilities, curriculum, able students, and provided the upper levels of the entering
university classes”).
124

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2022

308

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

[Vol. 17

40000

(numbers in thousands)

35000
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000

0
1949 1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981
Primary schools

Junior High Schools

Senior High Schools

Figure 1 Enrollment in Primary and Secondary Schools, 1949–1981129

The Cultural Revolution made education, if at all, accessible
to all workers and peasants and only to them, thus instituting an
extreme form of educational equality for the workforce in the sense
of equality of results. The constant Red vs. Expert debate in the
field of education revolved around whether more emphasis should
be placed on the training of industrial technicians or extending basic
education to the workers and peasants who were most loyal to
socialism.130 The years between the mid-1960s to the late 1970s
witnessed the absolute triumph of the “red” and the darkest moment
in the history of education in China. On the one hand, law-making
and decision-making power in education was usurped by the
populist working people. In response to the CCPCC’s call for a
radical change in the domination of schools by bourgeois
intellectuals, schools at all levels throughout the country set up
revolutionary committees to decentralize education management. 131
They brought together representatives of the workers and peasants,
revolutionary cadres, and teachers and students in a “three-in-one”

129
130
131

CHINA EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 1001 & 1021.
Montaperto, supra note 93, at 29.
Decision on Cultural Revolution, supra note 58, art. 10.
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combination (sanjiehe) of local school administration,132 an effort to
realize that “the working class must exercise leadership in
everything.”133
On the other hand, education, especially higher education,
was completely and almost exclusively opened to the working
people. The examination system, which had been considered as the
primary barrier keeping the working-class out of the university, was
among the first to suffer during the Cultural Revolution.134 Regular
college admissions ceased for six years after the authorities’
decision in 1966 to postpone enrollment in higher education for six
months that year.135 In the meantime, however, Peking University
and Tsinghua University, hailed as “the new-type socialist
universities,” enrolled more than four thousand workers, peasants,
and soldiers (WPSs) in 1970 under the principle of voluntarily
applying, people recommending, leaders approving, and schools
reviewing.136 By 1971, the authorities had formally abolished the
National College Entrance Examination and admitted WPSs on a
large scale to universities nationwide until 1976,137 only about 20%
132 See four editorials by Hongqi [Red Flag], Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily],
and Wenhui Bao [Wenhui News], in ON THE REVOLUTIONARY “THREE-IN-ONE”
COMBINATION (Foreign Languages Press 1968).
133 Yao Wenyuan, Member of the CCP Politburo, The Working Class Must Exercise
Leadership in Everything, 11(35) PEKING REV 3 (1968), available at
http://www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1968/PR1968-35-WorkingClassLeadership.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YE2S-CMXC].
134 Mary F. Berry, Relevance to American Needs, in CHINA’S SCHOOLS IN FLUX, supra
note 64, at 156.
135 Zhonggong Zhongyang he Guowuyuan Jueding Gaige Gaodeng Xuexiao Zhaokao
Banfa (中共中央和国务院决定改革高等学校招考办法) [The CCPCC and the State
Council Decided to Reform Admissions and Examinations for Higher Education], RENMIN
RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], June 18, 1966, at 1 [hereinafter Reform Admissions
for Higher Education]; CHINA EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 338.
136 Li Zhihua (李志华), Dajia Doulai Guanxin Gaoxiao Zhaosheng (大家都来关心高
校招生) [Everyone Is Concerned with the Selection of Students for Higher Education], 13
HONGQI (红旗) [RED FLAG] 846, 847 (1970), reprinted in RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报)
[PEOPLE’S DAILY], Sept. 21, 1970, at 1; Yiwan Gongnongbing de Yuanwang Shixian le (亿
万工农兵的愿望实现了) [The Wishes of Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers in Their
Hundreds of Millions Have Come True], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY],
Sept. 21, 1970, at 1, translated in 13(40) PEKING REV. 6–8 (1970), available at
https://www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1970/PR1970-40.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUR7ZR57].
137 Quanguo Jiaoyu Gongzuo Huiyi Jiyao (全国教育工作会议纪要) [Minutes of the
National Conference on Educational Work] (promulgated by the CCPCC, Aug. 13, 1971,
repealed Mar. 19, 1979), https://ccradb.appspot.com/post/672 [https://perma.cc/3D7ZVLLX]; 13 JIANGUO YILAI MAO ZEDONG WENGAO (建国以来毛泽东文稿) [MAO
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of whom had graduated from junior high school or higher.138 The
mismatched education levels of the WPSs caused enormous
hardship and calamity for higher education, where obscurantism
reigned and Tsinghua University was even dubbed Tsinghua
Primary School.139 Under those open-door education laws (kaimen
banxue), the selection of students was practically based on class
origin and political fitness rather than academic performance.140
Workers and peasants thus had access to equal education—in the
sense of equality of results—which was an extreme and radical
illustration of the Maoist concept of workforce equality in
education.
Educational equality, in the view of the Maoist communist
regime, translated into a right of equal access to industrializationoriented education for the workforce, i.e., workers and peasants.
The right was acquired on the basis of the group identity of the
“working people,” and the merit-based selection was undermined
and abolished time and again. 141 As a result, mass education was of
low quality and homogenous in content. Moreover, such education
was designed to train as many socialist-conscious industrial laborers
as possible in a timely manner, and was therefore universal and only
at the entry level necessary for industrial production. Thus, equality
meant the same treatment and, by implication, the same results. It
was through laws that reformed the language, expanded basic
education, and opened the doors to higher education that the
communist regime’s vision of equality for the workforce and for the
empowerment of the workforce became most evident. The
ZEDONG’S MANUSCRIPTS SINCE THE FOUNDING OF THE PRC] 239–40 (CCP Cent. Res. Off.
ed., 1998); Guanyu 1977 Nian Gaodeng Xuexiao Zhaosheng Gongzuo de Yijian (关于一
九七七年高等学校招生工作的意见) [Opinions on the Works of College Admissions in
1977] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 12, 1977, effective Oct. 12, 1977) (on file with
the National Archives Administration of China).
138 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYAO JIAOYU WENXIAN 1949–1975 (中华人
民共和国重要教育文献:1949–1975) [IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: 1949–1975] 1484 (Dongchang He ed., 1998); QINGHUA
DAXUE JIUSHI NIAN (清华大学九十年) [NINETY YEARS OF TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY] 279
(Tsinghua Univ. History Research Office ed., 2001).
139 Editorial, Gaohao Daxue Zhaosheng shi Quanguo Renmin de Xiwang (搞好大学招
生是全国人民的希望) [A Good University Admission System Is the Hope of the Entire
Nation], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Oct. 21, 1977, at 1 (reviewed and
approved by Deng Xiaoping).
140 Montaperto, supra note 93, at 32.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 135–140.
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popularization of mass education was a primary means by which the
government put into practice the concept of workforce equality.
B. Combining Education with Industrial Production
Another unprecedented educational equality law of the new
regime, enacted a little later than the movement for universal
education, furthered the mandate to “combine education and
productive labor.” This mantra was articulated in 1958 by Lu
Dingyi, the then supreme leader of education, encouraged by the
success of the First Five-Year Plan (1953–57).142 Mao soon
personally commented on Lu’s article for endorsement, thus making
that catchphrase replace universal education as the centerpiece of
the Mao-era education law since the Great Leap Forward.143
Education and labor were thus combined to mobilize even larger
participation in industrial production and to produce a better
educated workforce of maximum use for the ambitious Second
Five-Year Plan (1958–62).
Lu, however, was not in fact the inventor of that initiative.
His proposal was promptly adopted not only because it was the next
task for the CCP explicitly indicated in the Communist Manifesto,144
but also because it was a variation of Mao’s pre-founding
programme of “integrating labor power and armed strength.” 145 It
was also in Mao’s exposition of such programmes that his
philosophy of equality unfolded. Nowhere was this more evident
than in his advocacy of “help[ing] the youth and women to organize
in order to participate on an equal footing in all work useful to the
war effort and to social progress.” 146 In other words, Maoist
equality was a means to an end: in times of war, those who had
previously been excluded from participation in that work were given
the prerequisites and status to engage equally in fighting and
production. After the establishment of the People’s Republic and
especially after the First Five-Year Plan, the end of industrialization
142

LU TING-Y I, EDUCATION MUST BE COMBINED WITH PRODUCTIVE LABOUR (Foreign
Languages Press 1958).
143 MAO ZEDONG’S MANUSCRIPTS , supra note 55, at 338–42.
144 LU, supra note 142, at 22–23. See also MARX & ENGELS, supra note 33, at 27;
RONALD F. PRICE, MARX AND EDUCATION IN RUSSIA AND CHINA 11–75 (1977).
145 MAO, Production is Also Possible in the Guerrilla Zones (Jan. 31, 1945), supra
note 47, at 197, 199.
146 MAO, On Coalition Government, supra note 71, at 205, 238.
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led Mao to see equality as a means of empowering a larger
population to become an active industrial workforce. 147 To that end,
Mao went further to make a particularly blunt claim that genuine
equality could “only be realized in the process of the socialist
transformation of society as a whole.” 148 Thus, genuine equality in
education could only be achieved in the process of the socialist
transformation of education, i.e., in the integration of education and
production.
In line with this Maoist view of workforce equality, the
communist leaders saw education as fostering socialist
consciousness and eliminating the difference between mental and
manual labor.149 In Mao’s own words, the objective was to “enable
everyone who receive[d] an education to develop morally,
intellectually, and physically, and become a worker with both
socialist consciousness and culture.” 150 Thus, the Directives on
Educational Work in 1958 established that education was to be at
the political service of the proletariat and that it was to be combined
with productive labor.151 According to the law, all schools should
include productive labor as part of the official curriculum; 152 the
functions of schools should be partially interchangeable with those
of factories and farms;153 and governments and units at all levels
should establish schools of various forms, including half-work halfstudy and spare-time schools.154 In other words, through such
education programs, all those who belonged to the constitutionally
recognized “people” became equal industrial laborers:155 Students
147

ZHOU, The Implementation of the First Five-Year Plan and the Fundamental Tasks
of the Second Five-Year Plan (Sept. 16, 1956), supra note 96, at 217.
148 MAO, Editor’s Notes, supra note 75, at 263.
149 Lu, supra note 118, at 132.
150 MAO, supra note 67, at 405. This very sentence was then written into the
Constitution of 1978. XIANFA art. 13 (1978).
151 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 1. This very sentence was
then incorporated into both the Constitutions of 1975 and 1978. XIANFA art. 12 (1975);
XIANFA art. 13 (1978).
152 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 3.
153
Id.
154 Id. art. 4.
155 The Common Program put it explicitly that people, rather than citizens, had the
right to vote and to be elected, and that the political rights of landowners and capitalists
were deprived. GONGTONG GANGLING, supra note 8, arts. 4 &7. The Constitution of 1954
also deprived “feudal landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists of political rights for a specific
period of time according to law.” XIANFA art. 19, §2 (1954). So per the constitutions,
landowners and capitalists were certainly not belong to people. Mao saw people as
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were asked to participate in extracurricular industrial labor, while
workers were able to receive an education without interfering with
their routine production work.
Of those educational law measures, the most characteristic
of the Mao era was the part-time education for workers and peasants
through various types of schools. The first to be promoted
nationally and the first to fade away were the short-term middle
schools for workers and peasants (SMSWP). Drawing on the
Yan’an model and the Soviet experience, 156 such schools provided a
short-term quick-fix secondary education for a select group of
workers and peasants to enable them to pursue higher education. 157
That approach, however, was not as effective for intermediate
technical and specific expertise training as it was for literacy. The
authorities soon realized that the goals of those schools were
unrealistic and indiscriminate and that the education for workers and
peasants should be provided on a part-time basis.158 As a result,
some schools were transformed into regular secondary schools,159
and others were closed down by the education authorities in the
mid-1950s.160 The official closure of the SMSWP was a rare and
remarkable legal curb on the propensity for equality of results in
Mao-era educational equality laws. Since the Great Leap Forward,
including the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national
bourgeoisie. MAO, supra note 40, at 421.
156 Filippov (菲力波夫) & Li Jingyong (李敬永), Sulian Gongren Sucheng Zhongxue:
Zai Diyici Quanguo Gongnong Jiaoyu Huiyi shang de Jingyan Jieshao (苏联工人速成中
学：在第一次全国工农教育会议上的经验介绍) [Workers’ Short-Term Middle Schools
in the Soviet Union: Experience Introduced at the First National Conference on Workers’
and Peasants’ Education], 2 RENMIN JIAOYU (人民教育) [PEOPLE’S E DUC.] 14 (1950).
157 Guanyu Juban Gongnong Sucheng Zhongxue he Gongnong Ganbu Wenhua Buxi
Xuexiao
de
Zhishi
(关于举办工农速成中学和工农干部文化补习学校的指示)
[Directives on Organizing Short-Term Middle Schools for Workers and Peasants and
Tutoring Schools for Workers’ and Peasants’ Cadres] (promulgated by the Gov’t Admin.
Council, Dec. 14, 1950, effective Dec. 14, 1950), in 2 RENMIN JIAOYU (人民教育)
[PEOPLE’S EDUC.] 65 (1951); Gongnong Sucheng Zhongxue Zanxing Shishi Banfa (工农速
成中学暂行实施办法) [Interim Regulation on the Implementation of Workers’ and
Peasants’ Short-Term Middle Schools] (promulgated by the Ministry of Educ., Feb. 10,
1951, effective Feb. 10, 1951), in 2 RENMIN JIAOYU (人民教育) [PEOPLE’S EDUC.] 72
(1951).
158 Guanyu Gongnong Sucheng Zhongxue Tingzhi Zhaosheng de Tongzhi (关于工农
速成中学停止招生的通知) [Circular on the Suspension of the Enrollment of Workers’
and Peasants’ Short-Term Middle Schools] (promulgated by the Ministry of Educ. & the
Ministry of Higher Educ., July 12, 1955, effective July 12, 1955), art.1, § 1, CLI.4.183267
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Circular on Suspension].
159 Id. art. 1, § 2.
160 Id.
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an aggressive view of equality as sameness in terms of outcomes
had dominated education law.
It was against that background that the Directives on
Educational Works were promulgated by both the CCPCC and the
State Council in 1958, establishing the two other types of schools
for workforce equality to replace the SMSWP: the half-work halfstudy schools and the spare-time schools.161 The second type, halfwork half-study schools, advocated by Liu Shaoqi, the then
communist leader second only to Mao, were the most emblematic
form of combining education with productive labor.162 Those
schools enrolled both fully employed workers and students from
lower-level schools, and then provided training for them in
classrooms and factories, respectively. 163 The students attended
classes in regular middle schools and trained in factory plants for
vocational and technical skills, ideally on a half-day basis, and
sometimes on a half-week or half-month basis.164 In exchange, the
regular workers went to school to receive scientific and cultural
education while the students were at work.165 The half-work halfstudy schools were the most vivid illustration of the Maoist concept
of workforce equality—the education law provided workers with
not only equal access to secondary education, but also equal
education with students; it not only promoted the existing labor
force through education, but also directly transformed the youth into
an industrial workforce.
The third type, the spare-time schools, was the most flexible
and longest-lived form of education for the workforce. Those
schools were designed, since the early days of the People’s
Republic, to raise the technical level of industrial and agricultural
production and the political consciousness of the workers, especially

161

Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 4, § 1, cl. 2.
2 LIU SHAOQI, China Should Have Two Educational Systems and Two Labour
Systems (May 30, 1958), in SELECTED WORKS OF LIU SHAOQI 302 (1991).
163 Id.
164
Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇), Banhao Bangong Bandu Xuexiao (办好半工半读学校) [Run
Half-Work Half-Study Schools Well] (Nov. 6, 1965), RENMIN WANG (人民网) [PEOPLE
NET],
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/69112/73583/73601/74120/5039379.html
[perma.cc/QP5W-2Y5R] (last visited Sept. 13, 2020). See also Guanyu Zhongdeng Jiaoyu
Jiegou Gaige de Baogao (关于中等教育结构改革的报告) [Report on the Structural
Reform of Secondary Education] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 7, 1980, effective
Oct. 7, 1980), CLI.2.813 (Lawinfochina).
165 CHINESE EDUCATION UNDER COMMUNISM, supra note 62, at 39.
162
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the peasants.166 Since the schools were predominantly sponsored
and organized by such production units as agricultural cooperatives,
industrial plants, mines, and other enterprises, productive labor took
precedence over education. 167 The units often provided workrelated cultural and technical training during the workers’ or
peasants’ breaks.168 The spare-time schools were supposed to
combine education and production, as time and resources permitted,
according to local conditions. Education laws, however, revealed a
tendency to be dictated by a radical view of equality of results since
the Directives on Educational Works, which eagerly envisioned a
future where, “as the technology of industrial and agricultural
production improve[d], and as industrial and agricultural production
develop[ed], the hours of labor would be shortened, and there would
be no distinction between spare-time schools and half-work halfstudy schools.”169 In 1960, the State Council created a Commission
on Spare-time Education out of the importance it attached to the
spare-time schools.170
In addition to the three forms of schooling for the workforce,
the Mao-era education laws, combining education and production,
brought about a functional exchange between educational
institutions and production units. The Directives on Educational
Works stipulated that the direction of the subsequent educational
reform should be “schools to run plants and farms, and factories and
agricultural cooperatives to run schools.”171 This was a more
radical way of integrating education and production than the halfwork half-study schools, as the run applied to all schools and
166 Guanyu Dongxue Zhuanwei Changnian Nongmin Yeyu Xuexiao de Zhishi (关于冬
学转为常年农民业余学校的指示) [Directives on the Transformation of Winter Schools
into Permanent Peasants’ Spare-Time Schools] (promulgated by the Ministry of Educ.,
Feb. 28, 1951, effective Feb. 28, 1951), in 2 RENMIN JIAOYU (人民教育) [PEOPLE’S EDUC.]
71 (1951); Guanyu Jiaqiang Nongmin Yeyu Wenhua Jiaoyu de Zhishi (关于加强农民业余
文化教育的指示) [Directives on Strengthening Peasants’ Spare-Time Cultural Education]
(promulgated by the St. Council, June 2, 1955, effective June 2, 1955), CLI.2.160715
(Lawinfochina).
167 THE MAKING OF A MODEL CITIZEN IN C OMMUNIST CHINA, supra note 63, at 27;
CHINESE EDUCATION UNDER COMMUNISM, supra note 62, at 38.
168 Id.
169 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 4, § 1, cl. 2.
170 Guanyu Jianli Yeyu Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui de Tongzhi (关于建立业余教育委员会的
通知) [Circular on Establishing Spare-Time Education Committee] (promulgated by the
CCP Cent. Comm. & the St. Council, Jan. 16, 1960, effective Jan. 16, 1960), in RENMIN
RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Feb. 23, 1960, at 1.
171 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 3.
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production units throughout the country. On the one hand, schools
should, either independently or in cooperation with production
units, run factories and farms in which students were obligated to
work.172 At all levels of schooling, not only should there be a
significant proportion of vocational training and labor participation
in the curriculum,173 but also graduates should be urged to engage in
productive labor instead of pursuing further education. 174 There
were general education schools affiliated “themselves to factories,
worksites, gardens, and other places of work to establish a
permanent labor system,”175 not to mention vocational education
schools that were designed to send laborers directly to
workplaces.176 The same rule applied, if not more so, to higher
educational institutions. For example, “according to an extremely
incomplete survey, more than 3720 factories ha[d] been built by 115
colleges and universities nationwide by the end of July 1958.”177
On the other hand, the factories and agricultural cooperatives should
establish both technical schools to train the needed workforce and
general schools to “raise the cultural level of all personnel.” 178
Those educational and research bodies in the people’s communes
and factories were hailed by the then communist leaders in charge
of productive labor as one of the keys to accelerate industrial and
172

Id.
Guanyu Chuji Zhongxue Zengshe Nongye Jichu Zhishi Ke de Tongzhi (关于初级
中学增设农业基础知识课的通知) [Circular on Adding Basic Agricultural Courses into
Junior High Schools] (promulgated by the Ministry of Educ., Mar. 7, 1957, effective Mar.
7, 1957), CLI.4.183153 (Lawinfochina); Guanyu Gaijin Zhongdeng Zhuanye Jiaoyu de
Jueding (关于改进中等专业教育的决定) [Decision on Improving Secondary Vocational
Education] (promulgated by the Cent. Gov’t Admin Council, Sept. 26, 1954, effective
Sept. 26, 1954), art. 2, § 4, CLI.2.160360 (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Decision on
Vocational Education] (“The time for teaching internship and production practice in
secondary specialized schools should be 25 to 35% of the time of theoretical teaching.”).
174 Guanyu Zhengdun he Gaijin Xiaoxue Jiaoyu de Zhishi (关于整顿和改进小学教育
的指示) [Directives on Rectifying and Improving Primary Education] (promulgated by the
Gov’t Admin. Council, Dec. 11, 1953, effective Dec. 11, 1953), CLI.2.160289
(Lawinfochina).
175 ORLEANS, supra note 22, at 20.
176 Decision on Vocational Education, supra note 173. See also Calvin M. Frazier &
Wilson Riles, Work and Study, in CHINA’S SCHOOLS IN FLUX, supra note 64, at 117.
177 Commentary, Dazhong Xuexiao Ban Gongchang Huakai Biandi (大中学校办工厂
花开遍地) [Colleges and Universities Run Factories Everywhere], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日
报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Aug. 21, 1958, at 7.
178 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 3. See also Zhang Jichun
(张际春), Gengkuai Genghao de Fazhan Woguo de Jiaoyu Shiye (更快更好地发展我国的
教育事业) [To Develop the Educational Work of Our Country Faster and Better], 3(3)
HONGQI (红旗) [RED FLAG] 10, 15 (1960).
173
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agricultural development.179 As such, by making every school a
factory and every factory a school, 180 education and labor were
integrated to facilitate industrialization and achieve what Mao called
genuine equality.
Mao-era education laws consistently served the
constitutional vision of industrialization, and hence the concept of
educational equality remained the empowerment of the workforce.
Not surprisingly, therefore, Maoist education was not focused on
liberal arts, but rather building skills for the masses that directly
benefited industrial production. 181 Over time, the Maoist view of
workforce equality increasingly insisted on education not
differentiating between mental and manual labor. The emphasis on
labor in education increased after 1958 and reached its peak during
the Cultural Revolution. By that time, although the policy of
combining education and productive labor remained nominally in
place, labor was prioritized over education in practice.
In the context of the Great Leap Forward in 1958, the
communist leaders, spearheaded by Lu, began to emphasize the
socialist nature of education under the proletarian dictatorship, and
to criticize harshly the capitalist view that “education should be led
by experts” and “mental and manual work are separate.” 182 As a
result, the Directives on Educational Works, while laying out that
education was for the political service of the proletariat and to be
combined with productive labor, explicitly professed to eliminate
the difference between mental and manual labor.183
Those
statements were then reiterated and exaggerated during the Cultural
Tan Chen-Lin, Speeding Up Mechanism of China’s Agriculture, 3(39) PEKING REV.
6, 9 (1960), available at https://www.massline.org/PekingReview/PR1960/PR1960-39.pdf
[perma.cc/SF2B-MFPE]; Chen Zhengren (陈正人), Jiasu Nongye de Jishu Gaizao (加速农
业的技术改造) [Speeding Up the Mechanical Transformation of Agriculture], 3(4)
HONGQI (红旗) [RED FLAG] 4, 9 (1960).
180 GAMBERG, supra note 21, at 87–120 & 249–88; Colletta, supra note 106, at 138 &
143.
181 See e.g., Immanuel C. Y Hsu, The Reorganisation of Higher Education in
Communist China, 1949–61, 19 CHINA Q. 128, 138–45 (1964) (discussing the
reorganization of universities in the early 1950s was a reversal of the American-style
liberal education of the Republican era). See also Quanguo Gaodeng Xuexiao Yuanxi
Tiaozheng Jiben Wancheng (全国高等学校院系调整基本完成) [The Reorganization of
the Faculties and Departments of Colleges and Universities Was Basically Completed
Nationwide], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Sept. 24, 1952, at 1.
182 LU, supra note 142, at 4 & 24–27.
183 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 1.
179
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Revolution.184 The non-differentiation of mental and manual labor
not only addressed the Marxist-Leninist egalitarian aspiration, but
also reversed the traditional Chinese Confucian principle that those
“who labor with their brains govern others; those who labor with
their brawn are governed by others.”185 To that end, the communist
regime prepared the proletariat with literacy, technical skills, and
socialist consciousness through the aforementioned education laws
on one hand, and downplayed and demeaned the intellectuals on the
other.186 In 1968, at Mao’s behest, the education-labor nexus
focused even more on labor, leaving education, especially liberal
arts education, virtually despised. 187 The elimination of the
difference between mental and manual labor was further
exaggerated and abused during the Cultural Revolution, resulting in
poor quality education, years of suspensions, and the persecution of
countless well-educated intellectuals. 188 Ironically, educational
equality was achieved in the sense that the working people had
equal access to the same inferior education.
To sum up, the concept of workforce equality found its most
vivid expression in education laws combining education and
productive labor. If the laws of universal education were to
promote equality by granting opportunities for rudimentary
education to the masses of working people, then the combination of
184 Decision on Cultural Revolution, supra note 58, art. 10; XIANFA art. 12 (1975);
XIANFA art. 13 (1978).
185 MENGZI, TENG WEN GONG I, Ch. 4.
186 Decision on Cultural Revolution, supra note 58, art. 10, § 2; art. 11, § 2; art. 12;
Editorial, Guanyu Zhishi Fenzi Zaijiaoyu Wenti (关于知识分子再教育问题) [On the ReEducation of Intellectuals], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Step. 12, 1968,
at 1 & 11(3) HONGQI (红旗) [RED FLAG] 2 (1968), translated in ON THE RE-EDUCATION OF
INTELLECTUALS (Foreign Languages Press 1968).
187 Mao Zedong (毛泽东), Dui Cong Shanghai Jichuang Chang Kan Peiyang
Gongcheng Jishu Renyuan de Daolu de Pishi (对《从上海机床厂看培养工程技术人员
的道路》的批示) [Comments on “Take the Road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in
Training Technicians from Among the Workers”], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S
DAILY], July 22, 1968, at 1, translated in TAKE THE ROAD OF THE SHANGHAI MACHINE
TOOLS PLANT IN TRAINING TECHNICIANS FROM AMONG THE WORKERS 2 (Foreign Languages
Press 1968) (“It is still necessary to have universities; here I refer mainly to colleges of
science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling,
revolutionize education, put proletarian politics in command . . . .”).
188 The increased importance of labor was also evident in the change in constitutional
phraseology from “citizens have the right to work” in the 1975 Constitution to “those who
do not work shall not be fed,” and “labor is the honorable duty of all citizens capable of
working” in the 1978 Constitution. Compare XIANFA art. 27, § 2 (1975) with XIANFA art.
10, § 2 (1978).
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education and labor, especially in its later stages, was to empower
the manual laborers and overpower the mental laborers, thereby
reaching equality in results. With the constitutional vision of
industrialization, the goal of education in Mao-era China was to
produce socialist-conscious workers who were able to develop
morally, intellectually, and physically. 189 To that end, part-time
schools of all kinds, which focused primarily on education, were
explored to enhance the educational opportunities for workers and
peasants and their “all-round development.”190 The education laws
for students and intellectuals, who were not, or not yet, part of the
industrial workforce, meanwhile, placed more emphasis on labor in
order to transform them into workers. The integration and
juxtaposition of education and productive labor were designed to
empower and enlarge the industrial workforce for the Second FiveYear Plan. However, due to its lopsided emphasis on manual labor
and political consciousness after the Great Leap Forward and
especially during the Cultural Revolution, that educational equality
law catalyzed the homogenization of the better-educated and the
less-educated for equal results.

III. WHITHER EQUALITY: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT
Under the constitutional concept of workforce equality,
Mao-era education laws undoubtedly changed the educational
landscape in China dramatically. The basic cultural and technical
training associated with industrialization reached a large population
of working people, and productive labor made up a significant
portion of the curriculum at all levels of education. 191 As a result,
the workforce’s empowerment and expansion contributed
significantly to achieving the industrialization of Mao-era China.192
The Maoist concept of educational equality, in this sense, fulfilled
its role as a secondary constitutional value serving the constitutional
objective. It was, however, far less successful in delivering on the
CCP’s commitment to breaking down the urban-rural, industrial-

189
190
191
192

XIANFA art. 13 (1978); MAO, supra note 67, at 405.
LU, supra note 142, at 14–18.
See supra Part II.
See infra text accompanying notes 196–201
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agricultural, and mental-manual divides.193 Moreover, the Maoist
equal education laws created new problems of a mismatch between
employment and education: jobs in factories requiring entry-level
knowledge and skills were in short supply as the number of newly
educated people increased. 194 In response, the authorities enacted
laws and policies of planning in order to bridge the gap between
education and employment. 195
China’s rapid, albeit flawed, industrialization during the
Mao era was highly impressive, and the massive and empowered
workforce deserves much of the credit. In less than three decades,
China’s economic structure shifted rapidly away from agriculture to
industry, with the contribution of industrial output to gross national
product growing from 20.9% in 1952 to 47.1% in 1977, while the
share of agriculture fell from 50.5% to 29.4%. 196 During that
period, industrial output increased at an average annual rate of
11.6%,197 as fast as a country has ever industrialized in modern
world history.198 That remarkable achievement would not have
been possible without a burgeoning, diligent, and dedicated working
class. Under the Maoist egalitarianism, large numbers of peasants
and women who had been excluded from education and
employment joined the industrial workforce. For example, 70% of
the 2.45 million people newly hired in 1954 had been peasants, 199
and female workers also grew from 7.5% to 18.8% of the workforce
over the first decade of socialist China. 200 From 1952–1978, the
number of industrial workers equipped by Maoist egalitarian
education programs surged from 15.28 million, accounting for 7.4%
of total employment, to 69.45 million, or 17.3%. 201 The empowered
workforce’s crucial role for industrialization was particularly
193

See infra pp. 27–28.
See infra pp. 28–29.
195 See infra pp. 29–32.
196 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 116, at 3-1 (providing data from
which percentages were derived).
197 Id.
198
MEISNER, supra note 19, at 415–19.
199 John P. Emerson, Manpower Training and Utilization of Specialized Cadres, 1949–
1968, in THE CITY IN COMMUNIST CHINA 189, 190 (John W. Lewis ed., 1971).
200 John P. Emerson, Employment in Mainland China: Problems and Prospects, in AN
ECONOMIC PROFILE OF MAINLAND CHINA 403, 433 (the Cong. J. Econ. Comm. ed., 1967).
201 CHINA STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 116, at 5-2 (providing figures not
including those who were employed in transportation and telecommunications work
closely linked with industry).
194
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striking given Mao-era China’s technological backwardness and
hard labor-demanding industrial revolution.
Education laws under the concept of workforce equality,
however, did not work well in breaking down the divides they
sought to eliminate. 202 First, although the Maoist equal education
programs brought education to traditionally disadvantaged groups,
urban residents and brain-workers benefited far more from the new
educational opportunities than rural and manual-labor
populations.203 Before the Cultural Revolution, and especially in
the 1950s, the examination and selection system for formal
education, particularly at secondary and higher levels, was
meritocratic, thus favoring the children of socially advantaged
bureaucrats and intellectual elite over those of workers and
peasants.204
Second, the constitutional objective of
industrialization, focusing on heavy industry, was inherently
contradictory to the goal of eliminating the industrial-agricultural
differences. Massive fiscal and social resources in the Mao era
flowed with great priority to towns where factories were
concentrated.205 Behind the rapidly growing industrial figures was
the agonizingly slow development of the countryside and the
feeding of industry by agricultural surplus that might otherwise have
been used to raise peasants’ living standards.206 Aiming to expand
the industrial workforce, informal forms of education, such as halfwork half-study and spare-time schools, had factories as the primary
workplaces and workers as the primary training targets. 207 Even
with the education laws during the Cultural Revolution, which most
embodied the Maoist ideal of equality of results, the proliferation of
rural schools translated neither into many economic gains nor into a
fundamental change in the urban-rural and industrial-agricultural

202

Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 1.
MEISNER, supra note 19, at 125.
204 Id. at 125–26; Yuxiao Wu, Cultural Capital, the State, and Educational Inequality
in China, 1949–1996, 51 SOC. PERSP. 201, 214–21 (2008).
205
NICHOLAS R. LARDY, AGRICULTURE IN CHINA’S MODERN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
129–30 (1983) (revealing that agriculture’s investment share during 1953–1978 was 12%,
“only one-fifth that of industry”).
206 MEISNER, supra note 19, at 416, 418–20 (“While the income of state employees,
including regular factory workers, rose significantly during the late Mao period, the
income of peasants, who made up 75% of the laboring population, increased little, if at all,
after 1957.”).
207 See supra pp. 22–24.
203
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relationship.208 Last, compared to the stagnation, if not the
widening, of the rural-urban and industrial-agricultural division,
expanding labor-integrated education moderated the mental-manual
labor divide.
Those increased educational provisions were,
however, attributable to the subsequent imbalance between
employment and education.
The inability of the job market to accommodate the output of
schools is a common issue in most modern states. The salience of
that problem in Mao-era China could be attributed, in addition to the
population boom and increased supply of mass-education graduates,
to rapid industrialization and rural-urban migration.209 On the one
hand, the mechanization of agriculture and industry raised per capita
productivity, thus inevitably leading to a reduction in employment if
production was not expanded. 210 The rapid industrialization of
traditional labor-intensive industries, therefore, resulted in
substantial unemployment in densely populated areas, such as
Central China.211 On the other hand, the mass migration of job
seekers from rural to urban areas exacerbated educated
underemployment, if not unemployment. In general, the bettereducated rural youth were, the more likely they were to migrate
toward towns and cities due to the large disparities between rural
and urban incomes, opportunities, and living standards.212 That
urban-rural disparity was more pronounced in times when mental
labors earned higher rewards than manual ones, as it was before the
Great Leap Forward. 213 Therefore, the post-1958 equal education
laws, which vowed to eliminate the differences between urban and
rural areas and between mental and manual labor, addressed the
problem of urban unemployment more or less by discouraging
migration.214
In order to bridge the gap between education and
employment, the authorities launched aggressive planning programs
and laws that regulated employment, education, and population.
208

MEISNER, supra note 19, at 363.
See PEPPER, supra note 21, at 16.
210 See STIEFEL & WERTHEIM, supra note 103, at 22–23.
211 Id. at 11–12.
212 PAUL BAIROCH, URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT IN DEVELOPING C OUNTRIES 33–43 (1973);
Michael P. Todaro, The Influence of Education on Migration and Fertility, in THE
EDUCATION DILEMMA 180–82 (John Simmons ed., 1980); PEPPER, supra note 21, at 16–17.
213 See PEPPER, supra note 21, at 17.
214 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 1.
209
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First and foremost was a unified assignment program (tongbao
tongfen, UAP) of direct nationwide coordination of the supply of
college graduates with the type and number of jobs available.215 In
a highly centralized, planned economy, the state drew up detailed
enrollment quotas for each program offered by each educational
institution, which was obligated to enroll students according to
those plans.216 Similarly, the jobs of graduates were assigned by the
state to each position in each unit of the national economy according
to the state’s needs and graduates’ specialties. 217 The UAP was
established by the Government Administration Council in 1950,
when seven thousand college graduates from East, South, and
Southwest China were motivated to relocate to the northeastern
industrial zones.218 A year later, the Decision on Reforming the
School System formalized UAP in law, 219 thus vesting the power to
assign jobs to higher education graduates, especially those in

215

See PEPPER, supra note 21, at 17–18.
Guanyu Baozheng Wancheng Jinnian Gaodeng Xuexiao Zhaosheng Jihua de Zhishi
(关于保证完成今年高等学校招生计划的指示) [Directives on Ensuring Completion of
This Year’s Higher Education Enrollment Plan] (promulgated by the St. Council, Apr. 3,
1956, effective Apr. 3, 1956), CLI.2.161046 (Lawinfochina). See also ORLEANS, supra
note 22, at 94.
217 See Guanyu 1957 Nian Shuqi Quanguo Gaodeng Xuexiao Biyesheng Tongchou
Fenpei Gongzuo de Zhishi (关于1957年暑期全国高等学校毕业生统筹分配工作的指示)
[Directives on the Overall Assignment of Graduates from Colleges and Universities in the
Summer of 1957] (promulgated by the St. Council, July 31, 1957, effective July 31, 1957),
CLI.2.161552 (Lawinfochina) (detailing the 1957 plan as: “There were a total of 56,820
college graduates in the current year . . . The basic assignment is as follows: (1) A total of
9,702 were assigned to the Chinese Academy of Sciences and higher education institutions,
accounting for 17.08% of the graduates. Among them are 3,411 engineering graduates,
accounting for 18.9% of total engineering graduates. (2) A total of 13,190 were allocated to
the central industrial sector, accounting for 23.21% of the graduates. There are 10,524
engineering graduates, accounting for 58.3% of total engineering graduates. (3) A total of
4,519 were allocated to the sectors of transportation, post and telecommunications,
agriculture, forestry, water conservancy, finance, education and culture, accounting for
7.95% of the graduates. (4) A total of 1,284 were assigned to the People’s Liberation Army
system, accounting for 2.26% of the graduates. (5) A total of 28,125 were allocated to
various provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central
Government, accounting for 49.5% of the graduates.”).
218 Guanyu Fenpei Quanguo Gongsili Gaodeng Xuexiao Bennian Shujia Biyesheng
Gongzuo de Tongling (关于分配全国公私立高等学校本年暑假毕业生工作的通令)
[General Order on the Proper Allocation of Graduates from Public and Private Universities
Across the Country This Summer] (promulgated by the Gov’t Admin. Council, June 22,
1950, effective June 22, 1950), in CHINA EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note
106, at 348.
219 Decision on Reforming the School System, supra note 97, art. 4, § 6.
216
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engineering, exclusively in the central government. 220 Regarded as
both employment-oriented enrollment and graduate supply-oriented
recruitment, UAP aimed to reduce the mismatch between specialty
and occupation through central planning. A large number of
graduates, however, turned out to be assigned to jobs they were not
trained for, as UAP was inherently inefficient and failed to provide
an effective solution to the imbalance between education and
employment.221 Moreover, by targeting only higher education, the
UAP did not address the problems of significant numbers of low
and middle level education achievers and thus was greatly impacted
by the outcome-oriented view of workforce equality after 1958.
Plans for university majors and enrollment ratios were modified to
comply with radical industrialization planning, and college
enrollment and job assignments were practically disrupted during
the Cultural Revolution until 1977.222
The second and most notable policy was the mobilization of
urban educated youth to go to the countryside (shangshan xiaxaing,
EYGC).
Unemployment in the cities was based on the
disproportionate growth of the urban population due to immigration
and high birth rates. Therefore, there were two strategies to deal
with the problem: restricting townward migration and reducing the
birth rate. The former was undoubtedly more immediate. Despite
the deliberate curbing of the migration stream, 223 however, the
urban population in China surged from around fifty-eight million in
1949 to one hundred million in 1957, 224 with 45% of the increase
coming from rural migrants. 225 Conventionally, the problem of the
excessive workforce should be solved, first and foremost, through
220

CHINA EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 348–49.
See, e.g., Editorial, Zhenxi Rencai Tuodang Fenpei (珍惜人才，妥当分配)
[Valuing Talents and Assigning Them Appropriately], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报)
[PEOPLE’S DAILY], Aug. 2, 1956, at 1.
222 CHINA EDUCATION YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 349–50; ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYAO JIAOYU WENXIAN: 1976–1990 (中华人民共和国重要教
育文献: 1976–1990) [IMPORTANT EDUCATIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA: 1976–1990] 1579 (He Dongchang ed., 1998).
223
See, e.g., Guanyu Quanzhi Nongmin Mangmu Liuru Chengshi de Zhishi (关于劝
止农民盲目流入城市的指示) [Directives on Dissuading Peasants from Blindly Entering
the City] (promulgated by the Gov’t Admin. Council, Apr. 17, 1953, effective Apr. 17,
1953), CLI.2.160268 (Lawinfochina).
224 ZHONGGUO RENKOU (中国人口) [POPULATION OF CHINA] 272 (Yuan Yongxi ed.,
1991).
225 XIN ZHONGGUO RENKOU WUSHI NIAN (新中国人口五十年) [THE POPULATION OF
NEW CHINA IN FIFTY YEARS] 1173 (Lu Yu ed., 2004).
221
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accelerated urban industrial development. 226 In 1960, however, the
false bubble of prosperity caused by the Great Leap Forward burst,
and depression followed, resulting in large-scale abandonment of
unfinished projects and employment shrinking.227 Some CCP
leaders began to recognize the huge disparity between urban and
rural areas, and between industry and agriculture. 228 To correct the
overemphasis on industry in the 1950s, agricultural modernization
was elevated to a much higher priority, with the wording of the
Constitution changed to “agriculture as the foundation of the
national economy, with industry as the leading factor.”229
The educational equality law also sought to eliminate the
urban-rural difference alongside the mental-manual labor
difference.230 In order to promote rural industrialization,231 between
1962 and 1966, more than one million urban youths responded to
the central government’s call to settle in the countryside to
strengthen the rural workforce. 232 After the Cultural Revolution
began, many schools were closed, 233 college enrollment was
suspended,234 and factories stopped hiring, thus making a large
number of idle urban college and high school students an urgent
social problem to be solved. It was against this backdrop that Mao
announced in 1968 an official directive for “urban educated youth to
go to the countryside to be reeducated by the poor peasants.” 235 As
a result, tens of millions of the youth were sent to the rural areas
over the next decade, relieving the pressure of urban employment
and resulting in a phenomenon of reverse urbanization rarely seen in
226

See STIEFEL & WERTHEIM, supra note 103, at 14.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 35.
228 BO YIBO (薄一波), R UOGAN ZHONGDA J UECE YU S HIJIAN DE HUIGU (若干重大决策
与事件的回顾) [REVIEW OF SEVERAL MAJOR DECISIONS AND EVENTS] 1050–60 (1993).
229 XIANFA art. 10 (1975); XIANFA art. 11, § 2 (1978).
230 Directives on Educational Work, supra note 125, art. 3, § 1.
231 Colletta, supra note 106, at 144.
232 JIEFANG RIBAO [L IBERATION D AILY] (Apr. 23, 1965), cited by BERNSTEIN, supra
note 21, at 35; STIEFEL & WERTHEIM, supra note 103, at 15.
233 Guanyu Nongcun Wuchan Jieji Wenhua Da Geming de Zhishi (关于农村无产阶
级文化大革命的指示（草案）) [Directives on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
in the Countryside (Tentative)] (promulgated by the CCPCC, Dec. 15, 1966, effective Dec.
15, 1966), in 18(1) SHANXI PEOPLE’S GOV’T GAZ. 5 (1967), art. 9 (“Secondary schools
should be closed for the revolution.”).
234 Reform Admissions for Higher Education, supra note 135; C HINA EDUCATION
YEARBOOK 1949–1981, supra note 106, at 338.
235 Mao Zhuxi Yulu (毛主席语录) [Quotations from Chairman Mao], RENMIN RIBAO
(人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Dec. 22, 1968, at 1.
227
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the post-war world.236 In the regime’s propaganda to mobilize the
youth, “we also have two hands, so we will not eat the cities’ food
for free” was a striking and popular catchword, implying the
movement’s imperative to divert excess urban labor. 237
Moreover, as with the law combining education with
productive labor, EYGC also had a workforce equality implication.
For one thing, it increased the rural labor force by sending young
people to the countryside. 238 For another, as the official rationale
given by the CCP, EYGC was to narrow three major differences
through alleged re-education: the urban-rural difference, the
industrial-agricultural difference, and the difference between mental
and manual labor. 239 In some cases, those young people, most of
whom had a lower secondary education, contributed to the
modernization of the rural sector and to the technical training of
peasants.240 The EYGC movement, however, deprived numerous
youth of the opportunity to further their education, leaving a lost
generation and a knowledge gap that the post-Mao reforms
struggled to remedy.241
In contrast to the direct control of labor mobility, family
planning was a more indirect and long-term policy response to high
unemployment. In the 1950s, some policymakers had already
recognized the need to regulate the population and included
“appropriately promote birth control” in the Second Five-Year
Plan.242 Birth control, however, was seen as a political conspiracy
236 BERNSTEIN, supra note 21, at 32, 39–40 (estimating that the number was 5.4 million
during 1968–70, 2.65 million in 1971–73, and about 2 million per year in 1974 and 1975).
237 Editorial, Women ye You Liangzhishou Buzai Chengshi li Chixianfan (我们也有两
只手，不在城市里吃闲饭) [“We Also Have Two Hands, So We Will Not Eat the Cities’
Food for Free”], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Dec. 22, 1968, at 1.
238 See STIEFEL & WERTHEIM, supra note 103, at 14–15.
239 Editorial, Jianchi Zhishi Qingnian Shangshan Xiaxiang de Zhengque Fangxiang
(坚持知识青年上山下乡的正确方向) [Insisting on the Right Direction for Educated
Youth to Go to the Countryside], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], July 9,
1967, at 2.
240 Frazier & Riles, supra note 176, at 118; STIEFEL & WERTHEIM, supra note 103, at
14–15.
241
See, e.g., MICHEL BONNIN, THE LOST GENERATION: THE RUSTICATION OF CHINA’S
EDUCATED YOUTH (1968–1980) (Krystyna Horko trans., 2013). See also 3 WORLD BANK,
CHINA: SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 134 (1983) (estimating that there were “2
million middle-level technicians and 1 million college and university graduates who would
otherwise have been graduated during the late 1960s and early 1970s”).
242 See Shao Zili (邵力子), Member, the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Wodui Jieyu Wenti de Yidian Yijian (我对节育问题的一点意见) [My Comments on Birth
Control], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], June 26, 1956, at 2; Ma Yinchu
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of the Rightists, and was discredited after 1958. 243 The Fourth FiveYear Plan (1971-1975) set, for the first time, the goal of reducing
the rate of population growth, marking the official launch of the
family planning policy.244 As a result, by state coercion, China’s
population growth rate fell from 2.747% in 1971 to 1.254% in 1980,
below the world average of 1.749% at the time.245 In Post-Mao
China, both Constitutions established family planning as a basic
state policy,246 and the Marriage Law stipulated that “[b]oth
husband and wife shall have the duty to practise family
planning.”247 The National People’s Congress, meanwhile, created
a new specialized agency, the National Family Planning
Commission.248 Family planning then became a national legal
mandate, which accounted for 150 million fewer children over the
next two decades. 249 Thus, although its effects were not as evident
in the Mao era, family planning alleviated the tensions associated
with unemployment to the extent that it reduced the number of job

(马寅初), Member, the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Xin Renkou Lun (新人口
论) [New Population Theory], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], July 5, 1957,
at 11; Chou En-Lai, Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for
Development of the National Economy (Sept. 16, 1956), in PROPOSAL FOR THE SECOND
FIVE-YEAR PLAN, supra note 53, at 39, 98.
243
Li Pu (李普), Buxu Youpai Liyong Renkou Wenti Jinxing Zhengzhi Yinmou (不许
右派利用人口问题进行政治阴谋) [The Rightists Are Not Allowed to Use the Population
Issue for Political Conspiracy], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Oct. 14,
1957, at 7. See also John S. Aird, Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the
People’s Republic of China, in PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 220, 302–04 (the Cong. J.
Econ. Comm. ed., 1972).
244 Wang Feng et al., Population, Policy, and Politics: How Will History Judge
China’s One-Child Policy?, 38 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 115, 117 (2012).
245 WORLD BANK OPEN DATA, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW
[https://perma.cc/U3QU-3LPJ].
246 XIANFA art. 53, §3 (1978) (“The State promotes and implements family
planning.”); XIANFA art. 25 (1982) (“The state implements family planning so that
population growth is compatible with economic and social development plans.”).
247 Hunyin Fa (婚姻法) [Marriage Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Sept. 1, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981), CLI.1.797(EN) (Lawinfochina), art. 12.
248
Guanyu Sheli Guojia Jihua Shengyu Weiyuanhui de Jueyi (关于设立国家计划生
育委员会的决议) [Decision on Establishing the National Family Planning Commission]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 6, 1981, effective
Mar. 6, 1981), CLI.1.176730 (Lawinfochina).
249 Xue Dong (薛冬) & Li Wei (李薇), Shixing Jihua Shengyu Woguo 20 Nian
Zhishao Shaosheng 2.5 Yige Haizi (实行计划生育我国20年少生2.5亿个孩子) [China
Has 250 Million Fewer Children for the 20 Years implementing The Family Planning
Policy], GUANGMING RIBAO (光明日报) [GUANGMING DAILY], Sept. 22, 2000, at A3.
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seekers and lowered their wage demands by reducing the number of
their family members.250
In summary, the Mao-era educational equality laws set out
to provide equal mass education for the working people. By
creating an enlarged and empowered industrial workforce, the
Maoist egalitarianism facilitated socialist China’s industrial
transformation. A surge in educational supply, however, resulted in
a mismatch between it and the accommodating job market, posing
new problems. In an attempt to bridge that gap between
employment and education, the government initiated several
changes in the laws on education, employment, and population, with
much success but also many grievances. Although they alleviated
the imbalance, those policies, like the equal education laws to which
they responded, struggled to reduce the disparities between town
and
countryside
and
between
industry/workers
and
agriculture/peasants.

CONCLUSION
Winding up from a hundred years’ social disturbance,
political instability, and intellectual anarchy, post-war China was
desperate to realize national independence and to get rid of poverty.
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, China
had, in trial and error, attempted to build an industrialized socialist
state for three decades until the Constitution of 1982 declared a
reform era. Facing challenges near and far, the nascent communist
regime under Mao set rapid industrialization as its constitutional
goal, which included both socialist reconstruction and socialist
revolution. Mao-era China’s transition from an agricultural to an
industrial country required a large supply of workers at a time when
illiteracy rates were extremely high. Providing equal education to
those who had been denied access to education in order to make
them qualified industrial workers, therefore, became the very point
of achieving rapid industrialization. It is in this sense that equality
in education took on an empowering connotation in the
constitutional vision. It means that the historical actors who were
250 See ZHOU, Problems of Policy for Economic Development (Nov. 10, 1956), supra
note 96, at 233 (explaining the reason for birth control was that “we cannot make
everybody employed in a short period of time, and the increase in wages cannot afford a
large family population of employees”).
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crucial in shaping constitutional conceptualizations held a
workforce-oriented idea of equality of results, which sought to
empower the masses to become an equal, if not homogenous,
workforce through education.
That conception of empowerment-as-equality was evidently
revealed in the educational revolution of the Maoist regime,
particularly in two education laws: One was universal education
aimed at including all in education programs; the other was the
combination of education and productive labor whereby students
were transformed into laborers and workers were trained to become
a competent socialist workforce. Through various education
programs, the authorities included the masses of workers and
peasants in the socialist education program, equipping them with the
knowledge and skills needed for socialist reconstruction and the
socialist consciousness required for the socialist revolution.
Moreover, calling on combining education with productive labor,
the regime endeavored to conduct literacy education and technical
training to the working-class and directly transform students into
laborers working in factories and farms. As such, the Maoist equal
education laws for the traditionally disadvantaged sought to
empower the masses to become the desired workforce for pursuing
industrialization. The Maoist vision for educational equality was, in
other words, empowerment. In the process of putting that concept
of equality-as-empowerment into practice, intellectuals and other
mental laborers were trained as industrial or agricultural workers,
thus achieving the constitutional vision of workforce equality.
The Maoist concept of educational equality was successful
in fueling industrialization, yet in a sense, it also sowed the seeds of
its own demise. Under the goal of industrialization, the economic
disparities between industry and agriculture and between urban and
rural areas would inevitably exist, if not widen. During the Mao
era, the countryside was economically exploited by the cities. 251 By
the late 1970s, most peasants were probably economically worse off
than they had been in the 1950s and even the 1930s.252 Similarly,
Maoist educational equality laws served primarily to transform the
251

MEISNER, supra note 19, at 363.
YANG JISHENG (杨继绳), ZHONGGUO GAIGE NIANDAI DE ZHENGZHI DOUZHENG (中
国改革年代的政治斗争) [POLITICAL CONFLICTS DURING CHINA’S REFORM] 40 (2004)
(“two-thirds of peasants in 1978 had an income lower than that in the 1950s, and one-third
had an income even lower than that in the 1930s before the Japanese invasion of China.”).
252
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masses into a more trained industrial workforce, leaving the
countryside and peasantry somewhat neglected. Most of the
vigorous rural egalitarian education programs were also of poor
quality, ending in many cases at literacy.
Moreover, the
unprecedented large scale of education supply created a huge gap
between education and employment. Laws and policies that
attempted to bridge the gap were only palliative and did not address
the root causes of the problem: the disparities between urban and
rural areas and between workers and peasants. Worse, some, such
as the planned college specialties that were exclusively industryrelated, the dual urban-rural household system that restricted
migration,253 and the dual urban-rural family planning quota,254
even exacerbated the divisions and disparities. Despite the
Constitutions’ reiteration that “the alliance of workers and peasants
is the basis of the dictatorship of proletariat,” 255 it is clear that in the
Mao era, when industrialization was the constitutional goal, industry
and industrial workers were the main protagonists. The peasants
and the rural sector, on the other hand, were de facto marginalized
in the Maoist economic structure.
The rusticated youth were also an educationally and
economically marginalized group. The Maoist regime sacrificed the
opportunity for millions of young people to continue their education
in exchange for relief from urban employment pressures. And when
they finally managed to return to the cities, many of the youth found
it still difficult to get hired in factories and even harder to get into
universities. As a result, most of them became what the authorities
called “to-be-employed youth” (daiye qingnian) and “socially idle
laborers,” and hence marginalized by the planned economy of the
late Mao era.256
It was, however, precisely in those two
Tiejun Cheng & Mark Selden, The Origins and Consequences of China’s Hukou
System, 139 CHINA Q. 644 (1994).
254 According to the Law on Legislation, provincial people’s congresses formulate
local population regulations. In general, rural couples in each province are allowed to have
a second child if their first child is a girl. See Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July
1, 2000), CLI.1.26942(EN) (Lawinfochina), art. 8; Hu Huiting, Family Planning Law and
China’s
Birth
Control
Situation,
CHINA
(Oct.
18,
2002),
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2002/Oct/46138.htm [https://perma.cc/5FP5-TAK2].
255 XIANFA art. 1 (1954); XIANFA art. 1 (1975); XIANFA art. 1 (1978); XIANFA art. 1
(1982).
256 See, e.g., Anpai An Zhengce Liucheng de Daiye Qingnian he Qita Shehui Xiansan
Laodongli Jiuye (安排按政策留城的待业青年和其他社会闲散劳动力就业) [Arranging
253
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marginalized groups that the post-Mao reforms found their outlet.
The desperate peasants who privately negotiated a family
smallholding system led to the de-collectivization reform, which
was the prelude to the market-oriented reforms.257 The mounting
employment pressure and the risk of large-scale social unrest caused
by the unemployed youth made the government “open the door to
employment” and gradually liberalize the individual economy, 258
which also became the vanguard of the market transformation. 259
The Maoist equality-as-empowerment ideal, by overemphasizing
industrial labor to the point of overlooking if not exacerbating the
peasants’ hardships, and by producing a population with an
education that exceeded the available employment opportunities,
ironically created the conditions for a new wave of reforms and a
new constitutional conception of educational equality. It was the
peasants and unemployed youth who were most deprived by the
Maoist workforce egalitarianism that became the forerunners of
post-Mao market-oriented reforms. It was in those marginalized
groups that the seeds of reform quietly sprouted.

for the Employment of To-Be-Employed Youths and Other Socially Idle Laborers Who Had
Stayed in the City Per Policy], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], Feb. 28,
1979, at 2.
257 Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang he Wanshan Nongye Shengchan Zerenzhi (关于进一步加
强和完善农业生产责任制的几个问题) [Several Questions About Further Strengthening
and Improving the Responsibility System for Agricultural Production] (promulgated by the
CCP Cent. Comm., Sept. 27, 1980, effective Sept. 27, 1980), in 20(6) SHANXI PEOPLE’S
GOV’T GAZ. 1 (1981).
258 Xue Muqiao Tongzhi Jiu Chengzhen Laodong Jiuye Wenti Fabiao Tanhua (薛暮桥
同志就城镇劳动就业问题发表谈话) [Comrade Xue Muqiao Delivers a Speech on Urban
Labor and Employment], RENMIN RIBAO (人民日报) [PEOPLE’S DAILY], July 20, 1979, at 2.
259
See Guanyu Chengzhen Feinongye Geti Jingji Ruogan Zhengcexing Guiding (关于
城镇非农业个体经济若干政策性规定) [Policy Provisions on Urban Non-Agricultural
Individual Economy] (promulgated by the St. Council, July 7, 1981, effective July 7,
1981), CLI.2.1029 (Lawinfochina); Guanyu Guangkai Menlu Gaohuo Jingji Jiejue
Chengzhen Jiuye Wenti de Ruogan Jueding (关于广开门路，搞活经济，解决城镇就业
问题的若干决定) [Decisions on Opening Doors, Revitalizing the Economy, and Solving
Urban Employment Problems] (promulgated by the Central Comm. of the CCP & the St.
Council, Oct. 17, 1981, effective Oct. 17, 1981), CLI.16.1099 (Lawinfochina).
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